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EXPRESS PRECLUSION OF THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT FOR ALL 
BANKRUPTCY-RELATED MATTERS 
JOHN R. HARDISON† 
INTRODUCTION 
At least since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has taken a notably expansionist approach to the 
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), steadfastly refusing 
to find exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.1  
The Court has rejected arguments that the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements is inapplicable to 
claims under the Sherman Act,2 the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act,3 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 
the Securities Act of 1933,5 the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act,6 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,7 the Credit Repair 
 
† Adjunct Professor, College of Law, Northern Illinois University; Career Law 
Clerk to Hon. Thomas M. Lynch, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. 
1 See, e.g., Imre S. Szalai, A New Legal Framework for Employee and Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 653, 660 (2018) (“Since the 
1980s, the Supreme Court has radically transformed and expanded the FAA’s reach, 
far beyond Congress’ original intent.”); Stephen A. Plass, Federal Arbitration Law and 
the Preservation of Legal Remedies, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 213, 216 (2018); Jill I. Gross, 
Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of 
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 124 (2015) (“Starting in the 
1980s, the Court has held that courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability when 
deciding such claims, the FAA applies to arbitration clauses in all agreements 
‘involving commerce,’ and federal statutory claims are arbitrable as a matter of public 
policy unless Congress explicitly says they are not.”); Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, 
Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
503, 513 (2009); see also, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten 
the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend.”).  
2 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,  
636 (1985). 
3 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
4 Id. at 228–29. 
5 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 477 (1989). 
6 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991). 
7 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995). 
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Organizations Act,8 the Clayton Act,9 or the National Labor 
Relations Act.10  Indeed, the only case in which the Supreme Court 
had found an exception to the FAA for a federal statutory cause of 
action—1953’s Wilko v. Swan11 decision—was overruled in 1989.12  
Yet even in the face of this trend, every court of appeals13 to have 
issued written opinions on the topic has found that federal courts 
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction have authority to refuse to 
order arbitration or to stay a bankruptcy or bankruptcy-related 
proceeding in favor of arbitration, at least with respect to certain 
core bankruptcy issues.14 
 
 
 
 
 
8 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 95 (2012). 
9 See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
10 See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
11 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (invalidating agreement for arbitration to the extent 
that it would have required arbitration of a claim under Section 12(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477 (1989).  
12 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was 
incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of 
other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business 
transactions.”).  
13 The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applicability of the FAA 
to bankruptcy-related matters. One of the parties to the contract in the Court’s 
decision in the arbitration case Prima Paint Corporation had filed for protection under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but neither party raised the issue, and the 
Supreme Court did not address it. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395 (1967). It was the debtor-in-possession who sought to enforce the arbitration 
clause, not a third party or a creditor. Id. at 398–99. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the debtor, Soler, filed a petition under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code after the district court ordered arbitration of its claims against 
Mitsubishi. 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1985). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
arbitration proceeding “came to a halt . . . upon the filing by Soler of [its] petition for 
reorganization.” Id. at 623 n.12. But the effect of the bankruptcy stay was not an issue 
before the Supreme Court because Soler had sought and obtained a modification of 
the automatic stay permitting the appeal to go forward, asserting that “Supreme 
Court review of the case would be in the ‘best interest’ of the debtor estate.” Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844, 845 (1st Cir. 1987). 
14 See, e.g., Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382, 
387, 392 (2d Cir. 2018); Kirkland v. Rund (In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C.), 821 F.3d 1146, 
1150 (9th Cir. 2016); Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C., (In re White Mountain Mining Co., 
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 2005); Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 
489, 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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However, these courts have relied on policy reasons alone,15 
finding no express textual support for the proposition that  
the Bankruptcy Code overrides the FAA.16  This approach is 
inconsistent with rulings by the Supreme Court showing disfavor 
towards arguments of implied repeal17 or statutory interpretation 
based solely on general notions of policy or equity.18  Many of these 
court of appeals decisions also reference the “discretion” of the 
bankruptcy courts to not enjoin core bankruptcy matters based on 
conflict in policies,19 which is difficult to reconcile with the 
Supreme Court’s statements that the FAA “leaves no place for the 
exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that 
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on 
issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”20  
 
 
15 See, e.g., U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re 
U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that the FAA and the 
Bankruptcy Code “present[] a conflict of near polar extremes: bankruptcy policy exerts 
an inexorable pull towards centralization while arbitration policy advocates a 
decentralized approach towards dispute resolution.” (citation omitted)). 
16 See, e.g., Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters. (In re Elec. 
Mach. Enters.), 479 F.3d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 2007) (“find[ing] no evidence within the 
text or in the legislative history that Congress intended to create an exception to the 
FAA in the Bankruptcy Code” and therefore looking to “whether an inherent conflict 
exists between arbitration and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code”). 
17 There is a “ ‘stron[g] presum[ption]’ that repeals by implication are ‘disfavored’ 
and that ‘Congress will specifically address’ preexisting law when it wishes to suspend 
its normal operations in a later statute.’ ” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 
1624 (2018) (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988), superseded 
by statute, Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat.  
461 (1990)). 
18 See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (criticizing dissent for “retreat[ing] to 
policy arguments” and concluding that the “policy may be debatable but the law is 
clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must 
be enforced as written”).  
19 See, e.g., Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382, 
387 (2d Cir. 2018) (“If the bankruptcy court determines that arbitration would create 
a ‘severe conflict’ with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, it has discretion to 
conclude that ‘Congress intended to override the Arbitration Act’s general policy 
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.’ ” (quoting MBNA Am. Bank, 
N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2006))). 
20 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); see also Note, 
Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Test Case for Implied Repeal of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2304 (2004) (“There is no basis for the 
substantial discretion placed in courts by the current methodology. The FAA creates 
a mandatory binary framework: If a valid arbitration clause exists, arbitration must 
be ordered. If the FAA has been explicitly or impliedly repealed with respect to the 
type of claim raised, then arbitration cannot be ordered.”). 
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There is no need, however, for the courts to rely on general 
notions of policy, equitable considerations, or supposed equitable 
powers to find an exception to the FAA for bankruptcy-related 
matters.  Congress has expressly authorized federal courts to hear 
all matters related to a bankruptcy case notwithstanding the FAA 
or any contractual agreement to arbitrate.  Specifically, in the 
1978 bankruptcy amendments—carried through in the current 
text under the 1984 amendments—Congress broadly granted 
original jurisdiction to the district courts, and by delegation the 
bankruptcy courts, over “all civil proceedings arising under title 
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”21   
While the Supreme Court has been hostile to implied repeal 
or preclusion of claims under one federal statute by another, the 
bankruptcy jurisdictional statute contains express language of 
preclusion, stating that the grant of jurisdiction shall be effective 
“notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts.”22  
Under this statutory authority, district courts exercising 
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and by delegation, bankruptcy courts, 
have express authority to hear all matters related to bankruptcy 
cases notwithstanding any arbitration agreement to the contrary.  
In addition to the tenuous foundation of the lower courts’ 
policy-based approach, the approach is also in conflict with the 
bankruptcy statute in substance.  First, the current approach is 
too narrow, giving no authority to bankruptcy courts to refuse to 
order arbitration of “non-core” matters even if related to a 
bankruptcy case and indeed not permitting bankruptcy courts to 
hear certain “core” bankruptcy matters.  Second, the current 
approach places the burden upon the party opposing arbitration to 
demonstrate that a rare exception to the FAA is warranted.  
Instead, the jurisdictional grant gives original jurisdiction to 
federal courts to hear all matters related to bankruptcy cases, 
regardless of whether core or non-core.  While a bankruptcy court 
may have authority to permit arbitration of such matters under 
 
21 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2018). 
22 Id. 
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the doctrine of abstention,23 or pursuant to statute24 or rule,25 the 
burden is on the party requesting arbitration to demonstrate that 
arbitration will not impede the rights of any party with an interest 
in the bankruptcy case.  Importantly, that determination requires 
consideration of not only the rights of the counterparties to the 
arbitration agreement, but of all creditors and other parties with 
an interest in the bankruptcy estate.  Because of the permanent 
and far-reaching effect of the bankruptcy proceeding—whether by 
statutory discharge or by the terms of a confirmed plan of 
reorganization26—the bankruptcy proceeding is generally the last 
and only opportunity for creditors to assert their claims and to 
share in the limited remaining assets of a bankruptcy debtor.27  
Through the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and related 
jurisdictional provisions, Congress has ensured that creditors will 
have notice and the opportunity to participate in matters affecting 
 
23 See infra Part V; see also Patrick M. Birney, Reawakening Section 1334: 
Resolving the Conflict Between Bankruptcy and Arbitration Through an Abstention 
Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 619, 622–23 (2008) (suggesting that rather than 
viewing the FAA as restricting the ability of bankruptcy courts to hear matters unless 
arbitration is shown to inherently conflict with bankruptcy purposes, a “[more] 
appropriate analytical framework” to reconcile the two statutes is to see the grant of 
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court as absolute unless permissive abstention is 
warranted under the authority to abstain expressly granted in the bankruptcy 
jurisdictional provisions). 
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2018) (authorizing, with certain exceptions, district courts 
to “allow the referral to arbitration of any civil action (including any adversary 
proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the parties consent”). 
25 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c) (“On stipulation of the parties to any controversy 
affecting the estate the court may authorize the matter to be submitted to final and 
binding arbitration.”). 
26 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2018) (noting that discharge “operates as an 
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment 
of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal 
liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived”); 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1123(b)(5), 1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (2018). With certain exceptions, a bankruptcy 
plan of reorganization may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or of 
holders of unsecured claims.” § 1123(b)(5). 
27  
[D]ue to the impact on other creditors, consent should not be imputed even 
in debtor-derived claims. After all, a creditor who never signed an arbitration 
agreement may still have his recovery determined by arbitration, if another 
creditor has signed such an agreement and is allowed to enforce arbitration 
of his claims. Because the insolvent estate is finite and distributed pro rata 
to creditors, the arbitrator’s valuation of one creditor’s claim affects the 
recovery of other creditors as well. This effect is magnified if the arbitrated 
claim is entitled to priority and full payment before any payments are made 
on general claims. 
Marianne B. Culhane, Limiting Litigation over Arbitration in Bankruptcy, 17 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 493, 497 (2009). 
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the estate before their contract and property rights against the 
debtor are terminated.28  If an arbitration agreement is enforced, 
and the creditors were not parties to the agreement, the creditors’ 
due process rights may be jeopardized.29 
The courts of appeals so far have either not considered the 
importance of the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions to the issue 
or have not fully recognized the nature of and reasons Congress 
had for creating such jurisdictional structure.  In particular, they 
have overemphasized the 1984 amendments and the “core”-“non-
core” distinction contained within those amendments, which goes 
to the allocation of authority between district courts and 
bankruptcy courts, and not to the overall grant of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction to the federal courts.  They have also drawn 
unwarranted conclusions from the Supreme Court’s decisions on 
the interaction between the FAA and other federal statutes, none 
of which had language like the bankruptcy provisions.  Finally, 
they have too narrowly described bankruptcy policies and thus too 
narrowly described the scope of the bankruptcy exception to the 
FAA.  In particular, the courts of appeals have focused on notions 
of judicial economy rather than on the rights of other creditors and  
 
 
 
28 See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018(a) (“In a case under the Code, after hearing on 
such notice as the court directs and for cause shown, the court may permit any 
interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter.”);  
11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2018) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a 
creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity 
security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on 
any issue in a case under this chapter.”); 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2018) (“The United States 
trustee may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in any case or proceeding 
under this title . . . .”). 
29 See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 27, at 496 (“Bankruptcy is quintessentially a 
collective proceeding with centralized control of the property of the estate and 
creditors’ claims . . . [and the] inescapable impact of arbitration on third parties who 
have not consented is a cause for concern, given the collective nature of bankruptcy 
process.”); Note, supra note 20, at 2309 (“[A]lthough the FAA requires consent to be 
bound by an arbitration award, the Code has modified this background law by creating 
a system that will bind creditors through determinations of others’ rights regardless 
of nonparty status; this modification suggests the need to depart from a formalistically 
narrow definition of whose consent is required for arbitration.”). The Supreme Court 
has disfavored class arbitration as “rais[ing] serious due process concerns by 
adjudicating the rights of absent members of the plaintiff class . . . with only limited 
judicial review.” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019). Depriving 
bankruptcy creditors of their right to participate in matters affecting the estate raises 
even more serious due process concerns, as those creditors did not consent to any form 
of arbitration.  
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parties whose interests might be affected by the bankruptcy to 
notice and to the opportunity to participate in matters affecting 
the bankruptcy estate.  
This Article sets forth a more solid justification for bankruptcy 
courts to refuse to order arbitration of any matter related to and 
affecting a bankruptcy case through express preclusion.  First, this 
Article describes the historical development of the Supreme 
Court’s holdings on preclusion of the FAA in general and on the 
courts of appeals’ current formulation of a bankruptcy exception 
to the FAA.  Next, this Article discusses the statutory, historical, 
and policy-based support for reading the bankruptcy jurisdictional 
provisions as creating an express exception to the FAA, or 
alternatively as supporting an implied exception to the FAA.  As 
discussed, even if based on policy, the exception should extend to 
all matters relating to bankruptcy cases, and any presumption 
should be in favor of bankruptcy adjudication, not arbitration.  
Finally, this Article discusses the place of arbitration even within 
such framework. 
I. HISTORY OF THE FAA AND BANKRUPTCY 
A. The Supreme Court on Preclusion of the FAA 
Through the FAA, enacted in 1925,30 “Congress has instructed 
federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to  
their terms.”31  “Section 2[,] the FAA’s substantive mandate,”32 
states that: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, 
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.33   
 
30 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, 43 Stat. 883 recodified as Title 9 of the United States Code 
by Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 674; see 31 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL 
§ 904.2 (3d ed. 2019). 
31 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
32 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 629 (2009). 
33 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
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Consistent with this provision, the Supreme Court has held that 
“courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according 
to their terms.”34  While the text of the statute only refers to a 
“controversy [] arising out of” a “contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce,” the Supreme Court has broadly held that the 
mandate “holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal 
statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a 
contrary congressional command.’ ”35  Other portions of the Act 
provide for enforcement of this mandate, requiring federal courts 
to stay proceedings pending before them regarding issues covered 
by an arbitration agreement upon request,36 providing authority 
for a federal district court to compel arbitration of such matters if 
the court would have had jurisdiction “save for such agreement,”37 
and requiring federal courts to enter orders confirming an 
arbitration award upon application.38  
 
34 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quoting Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
35 Id. at 232–33 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 
(2012)). 
36  
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States 
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for 
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied 
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the 
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default 
in proceeding with such arbitration.  
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018). 
37  
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition [a federal 
district court which would have had jurisdiction save for such agreement] for 
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for 
in such agreement. 
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018).  
38  
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court 
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall 
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made 
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order 
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order 
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 
10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, 
then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the 
district within which such award was made. 
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2018). Under Section 10, an arbitration award may only be vacated 
“where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” the arbitrators 
were guilty of prejudicial misconduct or evidenced partiality or corruption, or exceeded 
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However, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that 
while “a court’s authority under the Arbitration Act to compel 
arbitration may be considerable, it isn’t unconditional.”39  The Act 
“applies only when the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is set forth 
as a ‘written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ ” and only if the 
agreement is within the scope of the Act.40  Although speedy 
determination and lower litigation costs are often espoused as 
benefits of arbitration over litigation, and Congress was not “blind 
to the potential benefit” of enforcing arbitration, the Supreme 
Court has “reject[ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the 
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution  
of claims.”41  Instead, the Court has held that “the Act was 
motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce 
agreements into which parties had entered” and thereby “overrule 
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to 
arbitrate.”42  Rather than “create[] . . . new legislation [or] 
grant[] . . . new rights,”43 the FAA was intended only to create “a 
remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in 
admiralty contracts” and thereby “place an arbitration agreement 
‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.’ ”44 
 
 
 
 
their powers or grossly and imperfectly executed such powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018). 
Section 11 limits the grounds upon which a district court can modify or correct an 
award. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2018). 
39 New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019). 
40 Id. 
41 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). 
42 Id. at 219–20 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). Because 
of “the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce 
specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted 
from their jurisdiction.” Id. at 220 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1-2 (1924)). Such principle had become “firmly embedded in the English common law 
and was adopted with it by the American courts” prior to the enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Id. 
43 Id. at 220 n.7 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)). 
44 Id. at 220 n.7, 219 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96–68, at 1 (1924)). The Court has 
highlighted that “a ‘rule[] of fundamental importance’ under the FAA [is] that 
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’ ” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. 
Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662, 681 (2010)). 
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As a federal statute, the FAA is subject to repeal or preclusion 
by another subsequent statute enacted by Congress.45  While it 
might be easy to draw the conclusion from the Supreme Court’s 
recent track record that the Court is unlikely to find that another 
federal statute supersedes the FAA, it is important to highlight 
what the Supreme Court has held and what it has not held.  First, 
the Supreme Court has never actually adjudicated a case where it 
was claimed that another federal statute expressly repealed or 
precluded the FAA.  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme 
Court, in dicta, highlighted four recent statutes through which 
Congress demonstrated “that it knows how to override the 
Arbitration Act when it wishes.”46  However, Epic Systems 
 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996) (explaining 
that the Court has long recognized that, with certain exceptions, “ ‘a general 
law . . . may be repealed, amended or disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’ 
and ‘is not binding upon any subsequent legislature.’ ” (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 
199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he 
will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in 
succeeding years.”); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 
(1991) (“Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[h]aving 
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights 
at issue.’ ” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1985))). 
46 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626 (2018). These included:  
(i) a 2002 statutory provision that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision 
of law, whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use 
of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating to such 
contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy only if after 
such controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in 
writing to use arbitration to settle such controversy.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a)(2) (2018);  
(ii) provisions added by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to a commodity 
whistleblower protection statute providing that (1) “[t]he rights and 
remedies provided for in this section may not be waived by any 
agreement, policy form, or condition of employment including by a 
predispute arbitration agreement” and (2) “[n]o predispute arbitration 
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires 
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section,” 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(1)–
(2) (2018);  
(iii) a 2010 provision in the statute establishing and governing the Bureau 
of Consumer Financial Protection, providing for employee protection of 
employees of entities regulated by the Bureau from retaliation for 
cooperation with the Bureau and providing with certain exceptions 
(1) “notwithstanding any other provision of law, the rights and remedies 
provided for in this section may not be waived by any agreement, policy, 
form, or condition of employment, including by any predispute 
arbitration agreement” and (2) “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable 
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involved only an argument of implied repeal.47  Similarly, in 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, another case involving only 
implied repeal, the Court cited some of the same recent statutes 
as support for its conclusion that had Congress meant to prohibit 
arbitration agreements in contracts subject to the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act, “it would have done so in a manner less obtuse 
than what respondents suggest.”48  Of course, not stated in Epic 
Systems or CompuCredit is that Congress equally knows how to 
make clear that it intends a statute not to override the FAA.49  Nor 
should Congress’s recent use of specific language imply that its use 
of more general language years before did not express intent to 
supersede the FAA.  As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Epic 
Systems, the statutes cited by the majority “are of recent vintage” 
and “each was enacted during the time this Court’s decisions 
increasingly alerted Congress that it would be wise to leave not 
the slightest room for doubt if it wants to secure access to a judicial 
forum or to provide a green light for group litigation before an 
arbitrator or court.”50  The fact that Congress has been more 
 
to the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this 
section,” 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(1)–(2) (2018); and  
(iv) a 2006 statute governing terms of consumer credit extended to members 
of the armed forces and dependents providing that  
[n]otwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Federal or State 
law, rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute 
involving the extension of consumer credit shall be enforceable 
against any covered member or dependent of such a member, or any 
person who was a covered member or dependent of that member 
when the agreement was made. 
10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2018); see also David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 665, 686, 740 App. A (2018) (listing federal legislation since 2007 addressing 
arbitration). 
47 138 S. Ct. at 1624. 
48 565 U.S. 95, 103–04 (2012) (first citing 7 U.S.C. § 26; then citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a)(2); and then citing 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)). The Court noted 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) 
does not itself limit arbitration, but rather grants express “authority to the newly 
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate predispute arbitration 
agreements in contracts for consumer financial products or services.” Id. 
49 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 651(e) (2018) (“This chapter shall not affect title 9, United 
States Code.”). 
50 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In contrast to the bankruptcy 
statute or the National Labor Relations Act at issue in Epic Systems, the statute at 
issue in CompuCredit was enacted well after the Supreme Court’s recent trend 
towards expansion of the FAA began. Indeed, the Court in CompuCredit emphasized 
that “[a]t the time of the CROA’s enactment in 1996, arbitration clauses in contracts 
of the type at issue here were no rarity [as] the early 1990s saw the increased use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts generally, and in financial services 
contracts in particular.” 565 U.S. at 103; see also, e.g., Noll, supra note 46, at 712 (“The 
more fundamental problem with the argument is that it places a burden on Congress 
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specific in several recent statutes does little, therefore, to show its 
intent in 1978 or 1984 when the bankruptcy jurisdictional 
provisions were enacted and modified, as “later enacted 
laws . . . do not declare the meaning of earlier law.”51  
Second, in virtually all of the cases in which the Supreme 
Court addressed an argument that a claim under another federal 
statute should be excepted from the effect of the FAA, the 
argument was that enforcement of the substantive claim itself 
served an important societal purpose that could be jeopardized if 
left to arbitration.  In most of these cases, the plaintiff had not 
pointed to any statutory text supporting the argument.  For 
example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., the court of appeals had found “the pervasive public interest 
in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims 
that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust 
claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration” despite “the absence of 
any explicit support for such an exception in either the Sherman 
Act or the Federal Arbitration Act.”52  The Supreme Court 
reversed, rejecting policy-based arguments—at least in the 
context of international transactions53—that antitrust actions 
were too complex for arbitration, that contracts involving antitrust 
issues have an inordinate danger of being contracts of adhesion, 
that potential arbitrators are likely to be “innate[ly] hostil[e]” to 
antitrust law, or that the national interest in enforcing antitrust 
laws demonstrated by the “crucial deterrent” of the statute’s 
treble-damages provision could not be achieved outside an 
American court.54  Instead, the Court found “no reason to assume 
at the outset of the dispute that international arbitration will not 
provide an adequate mechanism” and that “so long as the 
 
that makes no sense when the development of federal arbitration law is viewed in 
historical context.”). 
51 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998). 
52 473 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. 
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (1968)).  
53  
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need 
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that 
a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 
Id. at 629. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court later 
applied the FAA to antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts that 
apparently involved no international transactions or foreign arbitration with no 
discussion of the issue. 570 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2013).  
54 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632–35. 
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prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum,55 the statute will continue to serve 
both its remedial and deterrent function.”56  The Court also noted 
that the legislative choice to provide for enforcement through a 
private right of action rather than a direct regulatory structure 
already risked lack of enforcement by placing the antitrust cause 
of action “at all times under the control of the individual litigant: 
no citizen is under an obligation to bring an antitrust suit, and the 
private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive or judicial approval 
before settling one.”57  Similarly, the Court held that the general 
deterrent function of providing a private cause of action for claims 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
did not justify a court-created implied or policy-based exception to 
the FAA.58  Deterrence can be achieved through direct government 
 
55 In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court referred to this 
“effective vindication” exception as dicta, noting that while several later cases 
mentioned the phrase, none found it to apply. 570 U.S. at 235 (first citing 14 Penn 
Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); and then citing Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). Similarly, the Court in Italian 
Colors found that the mere possibility of increased litigation costs caused by a waiver 
of the right to class arbitration did not preclude a litigant from effectively vindicating 
the rights provided under the antitrust laws, particularly given the fact that federal 
law did not adopt the class action for legal relief until 1938. 570 U.S. at 236 (noting 
that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy 
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy”). 
56 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636–37; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[B]y agreeing 
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded 
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
57 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (citation omitted). In contrast, at least where a 
bankruptcy-related matter is brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession on behalf of 
a bankruptcy estate, approval of the bankruptcy court is required with prior notice to 
creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and other parties in interest. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 9019(a). Notice is also required for a trustee to abandon—and therefore 
choose not to pursue—a claim of the estate against third parties. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) 
(2018) (“After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate 
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the 
estate.” (emphasis added)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007(a) (notice of proposed 
abandonment or disposition). Although Section 554(c) provides for automatic 
abandonment of scheduled but unadministered assets upon closure of the case, 
creditors and other parties in interest have the opportunity to object to a trustee’s 
final report prior to closure of the case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009(a).  
58 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (noting 
“nothing in the text of the RICO statute that even arguably evinces congressional 
intent to exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the Arbitration Act” and “no 
hint in these legislative debates that Congress intended for RICO treble-damages 
claims to be excluded from the ambit of the Arbitration Act”); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at  
26–27 (noting petitioner conceded that nothing in text or legislative history of ADEA 
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action without need to judicially create an exception to the FAA.  
For example, as the Court held in E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 
an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee 
does not bind the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
and the “proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the 
agency to relinquish its statutory authority [to bring an 
enforcement action under the Americans with Disabilities Act or 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991] if it has not agreed to do so.”59  
The Supreme Court has also rejected arguments that vague 
and general statutory language protecting rights given under a 
federal statute demonstrate intent to override the FAA.  For 
example, in Epic Systems, the Court found that the National Labor 
Relations Act’s guarantee of workers’ right “to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection” did not make an arbitration 
agreement that barred class arbitration “illegal” or conflict with 
the FAA.60  Similarly, the Court has rejected arguments that a 
statutory provision that broadly and generally invalidates waivers 
of rights under a federal statute demonstrates legislative intent to 
displace the FAA, even if the statute elsewhere provides a private 
right of action.  In CompuCredit, the Court found that a statutory 
provision requiring credit repair organizations to provide 
consumers with disclosures, including a statement that they “have 
a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit 
Repair Organization Act,” together with a provision of the Act 
voiding and making unenforceable “[a]ny waiver by any consumer 
of any protection provided by or any right of the consumer under” 
the Credit Repair Organization Act did not reflect congressional 
intent to preclude the FAA.61  As explained by the Court, the  
 
 
 
 
explicitly precludes arbitration and the Court found no inherent conflict); see also 14 
Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (holding that the ADEA is no different in the context of 
a collective bargaining agreement).  
59 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). 
60 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V 
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995) (interpreting provision of Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act invalidating contract provisions “lessening such liability otherwise than as 
provided in” the statute as not invalidating an arbitration agreement requiring 
arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction, on the theory that the cost of international 
arbitration would lessen a plaintiff’s recovery, and therefore avoiding potential 
conflict with FAA). 
61 565 U.S. 95, 99 (2012). 
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disclosure provision only created “the right to receive the 
statement,” not a specific right to bring an action in a judicial court 
of law.62  
Similarly, the Court has found general antiwaiver provisions 
in the securities laws not to preclude the FAA.  Although the Court 
had held in Wilko that a provision of the Securities Act of 1933 
declaring “void” any “condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any 
provision of the Securities Act invalidated an agreement for 
arbitration of issues arising under the Securities Act,”63 the Court 
distinguished and later overruled that holding.  First, in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,64 the Court, in 
interpreting similar anti-waiver language in the Exchange Act of 
1934,65 held that the section invalidating any agreement “to waive 
compliance with any provision of [the Act]” did not apply to the 
section providing federal courts with jurisdiction over violations 
because the jurisdiction provision “itself does not impose any duty 
with which persons trading in securities must ‘comply.’ ”66  Two 
years later, the Supreme Court resolved the tension between the 
holdings in Wilko and McMahon with respect to the similar 
statutory provisions by finding that Wilko was wrongly decided 
and was clouded by the “old judicial hostility to arbitration” that 
the FAA was intended to end.67  The Court in Rodriguez de Quilas 
found that, as with the similar language in the Exchange Act  
of 1934, there was “no sound basis for construing the 
 
62 Id.  
63 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953). The Court had also expressed concern that the 
Securities Act was intended to protect investors in securities, who often have an 
unequal bargaining position and unequal information, and to prevent fraud. Id.  
at 430–31.  
64 482 U.S. 220, 220–21 (1987). 
65 The Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. had previously suggested a “colorable 
argument” that the two provisions were distinguishable because, for example, the 
Securities Act of 1933 provided an express “special right” of a private remedy for civil 
liability while there was no statutory counterpart in the Exchange Act of 1934, for 
which only an implied private cause of action was established through case law. 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513, 513–14 (1974). But the Court 
ultimately determined that the arbitration clause at issue was enforceable with 
respect to Exchange Act claims because of the international nature of the transaction 
and concerns for international comity. Id. at 515–16, 520 n.15 (relying also in part on 
the United States’s 1970 accession to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards).  
66 Shearson/Am, Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 227–28. The Court also noted that “the 
SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to 
vindicate Exchange Act rights.” Id. at 238. 
67 Rodriguez de Quilas v. Shearson/Am. Express. Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989). 
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prohibition . . . on waiving ‘compliance with any provision’ of the 
Securities Act [of 1933] to apply to . . . procedural provisions” such 
as the jurisdictional provision of the Act.68 
In contrast, Congress’s choice to place all matters with an 
impact on a bankruptcy case within the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy courts is primarily of procedural, not substantive, 
importance.  It enables the bankruptcy court, the trustees 
appointed to administer the case, the debtor, and all creditors or 
other parties with an interest in the bankruptcy estate to monitor 
the progress of a matter affecting the estate and provides the 
opportunity to assert their respective rights or objections.  It also 
places the matter before an adjudicator who can recognize the 
impact of the proceeding on the rights of parties to the bankruptcy 
case and can ensure those rights are respected.  Finally, it 
promotes orderly and efficient administration of the bankruptcy 
case and estate, permitting the trustee and other parties to assert 
their interests in the same court and pursuant to the same rules 
of procedure, with centralized notice to all affected parties.  
Therefore, the decision to place the matters before the bankruptcy 
court is not simply a matter of distrust of arbitration as a method 
of enforcing parties’ substantive rights.  Indeed, Congress chose to 
place such matters before the bankruptcy courts not only in favor 
of arbitration, but also in favor of all other judicial courts, state  
or federal.69  
Finally, it is important to note that while the Court mentioned 
jurisdiction in Scherk, McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quilas, the 
jurisdictional provisions of the securities laws were not themselves 
at issue in those cases.  Instead, in all three cases the only 
arguments raised were that the statutory provision voiding 
contractual waiver of rights under the securities statute should be 
read to include waiver of the right to have an action adjudicated 
by a judicial court or that the general purposes of the securities 
acts and the FAA were at odds.  No party raised a specific 
argument that the jurisdictional provisions of either the Securities 
Act or the Exchange Act themselves demonstrated congressional 
intent to repeal the FAA.  The Court, therefore, has only at most 
suggested, but never actually ruled, that a statutory grant of 
jurisdiction by itself is insufficient to override the FAA and 
preclude arbitration.  In McMahon, which held that the Exchange 
 
68 Id. at 482. 
69 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2018).  
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Act of 1934 did not override the enforceability of arbitration 
provisions under the FAA, the Court mentioned that the Exchange 
Act of 1934 provides that district courts “shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this title . . . and of all suits in equity 
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this title” but did not discuss the direct relationship of this 
provision to the FAA—an argument apparently not raised by the 
respondents.70  The Court has also briefly mentioned the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision of the Exchange Act in several other FAA 
cases in order to distinguish it from the Securities Act, which does 
not provide for exclusive jurisdiction—particularly while Wilko 
remained good law for the proposition that the FAA conflicted with 
the Securities Act.  For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 
in the midst of a discussion of a “colorable argument” that the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act are distinguishable because 
one provides an express private cause of action while in the other 
the right is only implied, the Court referenced the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision as additional support for its holding that the 
Exchange Act did not supersede the FAA.71  While one would 
normally think of exclusive jurisdiction as being less consistent 
with arbitration, not more, the Court reasoned this way because 
the issue was waiver, not jurisdiction.  The Court reasoned that 
because exclusive jurisdiction limits the number of potential 
judicial forums a plaintiff can choose, the deprivation of court 
access is somehow less of a hardship than if more forums were 
available.72  The Court did not rule on this ground, however, and 
instead distinguished the facts in Wilko and found that 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement at issue did not conflict 
with the Exchange Act because an international transaction was 
involved.73  The Court revisited the distinction between the 
Exchange and Securities Acts in Rodriguez de Quijas, noting as 
 
70 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).  
71 417 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1974). 
72 Id. at 514 (“The analogous provision of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for 
suit only in the federal district courts that have ‘exclusive jurisdiction,’ thus 
significantly restricting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” (citation omitted)).  
73 Id. at 519 (holding that invalidation of the international arbitration agreement 
would reflect a “parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws 
and in our courts [and] [w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in 
our courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The petitioner had also argued that 
Wilko was distinguishable because Wilko involved parties “exhibit[ing] a disparity of 
bargaining power.” Id. at 512 n.6. Ruling on other grounds, however, the Court found 
no need to consider that contention. Id. 
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additional grounds for overruling Wilko that the antiwaiver 
provision of the Securities Act was “in every respect the same as 
that” in the Exchange Act found not to conflict with the FAA in 
McMahon.74  Reasoning that the “only conceivable distinction in 
this regard” was that the Exchange Act provided for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction while the Securities Act did not, the Court 
found the concurrent jurisdiction provided by the Securities Act 
was more reason, not less, to overrule Wilko.75  The Court did not, 
however, revisit the unasked question of whether the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision of the Exchange Act should have been reason 
enough to override the FAA. 
B. Application of the McMahon Test by the Courts of Appeals 
In McMahon, the Supreme Court stated that the “burden is 
on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress 
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory 
rights at issue” and “[i]f Congress did intend to limit or prohibit 
waiver76 of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent 
will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, or 
from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s 
underlying purposes.”77  The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth 
 
74 490 U.S. 477, 482 (1989). 
75 Id. at 482–83. 
76 None of the courts of appeals to apply this language from McMahon to 
bankruptcy-related matters discuss why limitations on “waiver” of rights is applicable 
to bankruptcy matters. Waiver was relevant to the Exchange Act at issue in McMahon 
because the statute contained a provision declaring void “[a]ny condition, stipulation, 
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the Act].” 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78cc(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Exchange Act “was intended 
principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices,” and the 
anti-waiver provision helped ensure that protection was not easily given away. Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). In contrast, the courts of appeals do 
not rely upon or point to language in the Bankruptcy Code invalidating waivers of the 
right to proceed in a bankruptcy court. Additionally, while one purpose of bankruptcy 
laws is to protect debtors by providing a “fresh start,” an at least equally important 
purpose is to ensure a fair and equitable distribution to creditors. See, e.g., Kirgis, 
supra note 1, at 505; Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (explaining that 
bankruptcy power to avoid certain prepetition preferential transfers facilitates “the 
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.”). 
The concerns about arbitrating bankruptcy-related matters go beyond mere protection 
of debtors from the effect of agreements they entered into prepetition. Because the 
concerns and parties affected are broader, it is therefore not clear that the test set 
forth in McMahon is the correct one for bankruptcy-related matters. 
77 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The Fifth Circuit recently rejected an argument that language in the Supreme Court’s 
2018 Epic Systems opinion overruled or abrogated the McMahon test. Henry v. Educ. 
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and Eleventh Circuits—the only circuit courts with written 
opinions on the issue of the intersection of bankruptcy law  
and the FAA subsequent to McMahon—have all relied on  
the third “inherent conflict” prong of this so-called “McMahon 
test”78 to find or suggest that the FAA does not require 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of certain 
bankruptcy-related matters.79  Several of the courts of appeals 
have summarily concluded that there is nothing in the language 
of the bankruptcy statutes or their legislative history to show 
express congressional intent to override the FAA, though with 
little or no discussion of any actual statutory text or history.80  
 
Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2019). The creditor relied on 
language in Epic Systems stating that a party “seeking to suggest that two statutes 
cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of 
showing a clearly expressed congressional intention that such a result should follow.” 
Id. at 590 (quoting 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018)). The Fifth Circuit disagreed that the 
cases were in conflict, noting that while “the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems 
has a different tone, the test it employs is substantially the same as McMahon’s.”  
Id. at 592. 
78 But see Kirgis, supra note 1, at 517, 523–24 (suggesting reliance on McMahon 
“rests on a flawed foundation,” both because McMahon expanded, not contracted, the 
scope of arbitration and because the issue in McMahon was preclusion of a “ ‘claim 
founded on statutory rights.’ ” (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226)). 
79 See, e.g., In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C.,  821 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 438 (2nd Cir. 1977); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1156–57 (3d Cir. 1989); Moses v. 
CashCall, Inc., 781 F.3d 63, 71, 72, 73 (4th Cir. 2015); Matter of Nat’l Gypsum Co., 
118 F.3d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1997); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. 
Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 795–96, 798–99  (11th Cir. 
2007). Additionally, courts both before the 1978 amendments and after have looked to 
whether a bankruptcy estate or trustee is even bound by an arbitration agreement 
signed prepetition by a debtor—generally finding that such an agreement does not 
apply to or bind the estate with respect to creditor-derived claims, such as fraudulent 
transfer or preference claims. See, e.g., In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1152 
(“For the purpose of these claims, the Trustee stands in the shoes of the creditors, not 
the debtors. Only the parties to an arbitration agreement are bound by it.”); Allegaert, 
548 F.2d at 436 (“Since the trustee stands in the creditor’s shoes for [the purpose of 
Bankruptcy avoidance actions], he too should not be compelled to arbitrate these 
claims.”). On the other hand, where either a debtor seeks relief on his or her own 
individual behalf or where the trustee is pursuing an action inherited from the debtor 
and for which the trustee “stands in the shoes of the debtor,” the courts have found 
the arbitration agreement to be binding unless otherwise overridden by the 
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1154 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (In actions brought by the trustee as successor to the debtor’s interest under 
section 541 the “ ‘trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and’ . . . is bound to 
arbitrate all of its claims that are derived from the rights of the debtor under  
section 541.”).  
80 See, e.g., Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1157 (“Hays has pointed to no provisions in 
the text of the bankruptcy laws, and we know of none, suggesting that arbitration 
clauses are unenforceable in a non-core adversary proceeding . . . .”); In re Elec. Mach. 
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Others simply jumped to the “inherent conflict” prong of the 
McMahon test, finding it unnecessary to look to the statute or 
legislative history or not addressing the statutory text because the 
argument was not raised.81  While several of these cases found 
under the circumstances that the bankruptcy court was required 
to stay the bankruptcy-related matter at issue and order 
arbitration,82 others held that the court had “discretion” to refuse 
to order arbitration.83  The courts of appeals have expressed mild 
 
Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d at 796 (“[W]e find no evidence within the text or in the 
legislative history that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA in the 
Bankruptcy Code [and] [t]herefore look to the third factor of the McMahon test . . . .”) 
(citation omitted); Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(“This Circuit and sister circuits applying the McMahon factors to the Bankruptcy 
Code have found no evidence in the text of the Bankruptcy Code or in the legislative 
history suggesting that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA in the 
Bankruptcy Code.”). 
81 The Fourth Circuit, in Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain 
Mining Co., L.L.C.), noted a possible “argument . . . that the statutory text giving 
bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction reveals a congressional intent to choose 
those courts in exclusive preference to all other adjudicative bodies, including boards 
of arbitration, to decide core claims” but ultimately found it did not need to decide 
“whether the statutory text itself demonstrates congressional intent to override 
arbitration for core claims because [the] case [could] be decided under McMahon’s 
third line of analysis . . . .” 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (first citing Sisters of 
Providence Health Sys. Inc. v. Summerfield Pine Manor (In re Summerfield Pine 
Manor), 219 B.R. 637, 638 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998); and then citing McMahon, 482 U.S. 
at 227); see also, Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382, 
386 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that parties agreed “arguments regarding legislative history 
and statutory text were not raised below” and therefore the court only inquired 
“whether arbitration of Anderson’s claim presents the sort of inherent conflict with 
the Bankruptcy Code that would overcome the strong congressional preference  
for arbitration”). 
82 See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2006) (class 
action for automatic stay violation where bankruptcy case was already closed); Mintze 
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 231, 233 (3d Cir. 2006) (rescission; 
TILA, HOEPA, and HIFA claims); Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1149–50 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(non-core securities law action); In re Elec. Mach. Enters., 479 F.3d at 798–99 
(contract-based action against third party); Moses, 781 F.3d at 66 (violation of North 
Carolina Debt Collection Act). 
83 See In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 390, 392 (violation of discharge); Netflix, Inc. v. 
Relativity Media, L.L.C. (In re Relativity Fashion, L.L.C.), 696 F. App’x 26, 30 (2d Cir. 
2017) (“collateral attack” on “factual findings and distributions of property” 
underlying confirmed plan); In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1150, 1152 
(subordination and disallowance of claims); 344 Individuals v. Giddens (In re Lehman 
Bros. Holdings Inc.), 663 F. App’x 65, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2016) (subordination claim 
impacting claims allowance and priority in bankruptcy); Moore McCormack Lines, 
Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem., Inc. (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 
631, 634, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) (declaratory action against insurers); Moses, 781 F.3d at 
67 (declaratory action impacting claims allowance); In re White Mountain Mining Co., 
403 F.3d at 170 (characterization of investor advances as debt or equity); Gandy v. 
Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489, 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2002) (Chapter 11 
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variations in the standards they use on the issue.  For example, 
some courts have applied a bright-line test by which arbitration of 
“non-core” matters84 will never conflict with bankruptcy policy and 
purposes.85  The Fifth Circuit apparently applies an even narrower 
test, requiring the issue to not only be “core” but also to have an 
“underlying nature [which] derives exclusively from the provisions 
 
debtor-in-possession’s avoidance actions); Matter of Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 
1058 (5th Cir. 1997) (violation of discharge or plan injunction); In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 
1130–31 (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (6) non-dischargeability action); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. 
Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 1014, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (breach of contract claim asserted against estate).  
84 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) designates “core matters” to include: 
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate; 
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions 
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the 
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but 
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal 
injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of 
distribution in a case under title 11; 
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the 
estate; 
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit; 
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate; 
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences; 
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay; 
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances; 
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts; 
(J) objections to discharges; 
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens; 
(L) confirmations of plans; 
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash 
collateral; 
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from 
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims 
against the estate; 
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or 
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder 
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and 
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter 15 
of title 11. 
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). 
85 See, e.g., In re Elec. Mach. Enters., 479 F.3d at 796 (“In general, bankruptcy 
courts do not have the discretion to decline to enforce an arbitration agreement 
relating to a non-core proceeding.” (citing Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil 
Co. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 226 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2000)); Hays & 
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1150 (3d Cir. 1989); 
In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 640 (“[N]on-core proceedings . . . are unlikely to 
present a conflict sufficient to override by implication the presumption in favor  
of arbitration.”). 
648	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:627			
of the Bankruptcy Code.”86  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has 
stated that “the core versus non-core distinction . . . ‘though 
relevant, is not alone dispositive.’ ”87  And unlike other circuits, the 
Second Circuit has stated that the conflict with bankruptcy 
purposes must be a “severe conflict.”88 
The courts of appeals have been remarkably similar, however, 
in their identification of the bankruptcy policies potentially at 
issue with the FAA, though as this Article discusses below, they 
have too narrowly focused on centralization and judicial 
economy.89  The Fifth Circuit in National Gypsum identified the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code as “including the goal of 
centralized resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, the need to 
protect creditors and reorganizing debtors from piecemeal 
litigation, and the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to 
enforce its own orders.”90  The Second Circuit, giving as examples 
the automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s broad equitable 
powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), has stated that the core purposes 
of bankruptcy “allow the bankruptcy court to centralize all 
disputes concerning property of the debtor’s estate so  
that reorganization can proceed efficiently, unimpeded by 
uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas.”91  The Fourth Circuit 
has noted that the “very purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the 
rights of debtors and creditors, and Congress intended to 
centralize disputes about a debtor’s assets and legal obligations in 
the bankruptcy courts.”92  In applying this test, courts of appeals 
 
86 In re Gandy, 299 F.3d at 495 (emphasis added); see also In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 
at 231 (“[W]e believe that nonenforcement of an otherwise applicable arbitration 
provision turns on the underlying nature of the proceedings, i.e., whether the 
proceeding derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, if so, 
whether the arbitration proceeding would conflict with the purposes of the Code.”) 
(quoting In re Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1067). 
87 In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 1130. No court of appeals applying the McMahon test 
has found a non-core matter to be excepted from the FAA, however. See, e.g., Julian 
Ellis, A Comparative Law Approach: Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in 
American Insolvency Proceedings, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 171 (2018) (noting that “the 
hesitation [of some courts] to subscribe to a categorical approach seems more to do 
with the ‘core’ side of the equation than the ‘non-core’ side”). 
88 In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 387; see also In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 641 
(indicating that court must find “arbitration will seriously jeopardize a particular core 
bankruptcy proceeding”). 
89 See infra Section IV.b. 
90 118 F.3d at 1069. 
91 In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 640 (citations omitted). 
92 Philips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164,169 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). 
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have affirmed lower courts that refused to order arbitration of the 
following: discharge violations,93 actions to enforce the terms of a 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan,94 subordination or objections to  
claims against the estate,95 a Chapter 11 reorganization trust’s 
declaratory action against insurers to establish rights as part of 
conditional settlement with employees who had filed mass tort 
personal injury claims against the estate,96 a Chapter 11 debtor  
in possession’s avoidance actions against third parties under  
the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer and strong-arm 
provisions,97 and non-dischargeability actions under Bankruptcy 
Code §§ 523(a)(2), (4) or (6).98  On the other hand, courts of appeals 
have reversed and ordered lower courts to order arbitration of the 
following: a class action suit brought in a closed bankruptcy case 
for violation of the automatic stay;99 a Chapter 13 debtor’s action 
for rescission of a mortgage and claims under the Truth in Lending 
Act, the Home Owners Equity Protection Act of 1994, the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, and Pennsylvania consumer protection 
laws;100 securities laws actions brought by a Chapter 11 trustee  
 
 
 
 
 
93 Henry v. Educ. Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2019); Anderson 
v. Credit One Bank (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382, 387–88 (2d Cir. 2018). 
94 Netflix, Inc. v. Relativity Media, L.L.C. (In re Relativity Fashion, L.L.C.), 696 
F. App’x 26, 30 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Matter of Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 
1058 (5th Cir. 1997) (declaratory judgment whether collection efforts barred by 
discharge or plan injunction).  
95 344 Individuals v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros.), 663 F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir. 
2016); see also Moses v. CashCall, Inc., 781 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 2015) (Chapter 13 
debtor’s proceeding objecting to claim against estate, seeking to declare loan illegal 
and void); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (objection by Chapter 11 debtor in possession to proof of 
claim against estate).  
96 Moore McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem., Inc.  
(In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999). 
97 Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Kirkland 
v. Rund (In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C.), 821 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (fraudulent 
conveyance, subordination and disallowance actions brought by Chapter 7 trustee 
against creditor who had filed proof of claim against estate). 
98 Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012). 
99 MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006). 
100 Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 226, 233, (3d Cir. 
2006); see also Moses, 781 F.3d at 66 (claim for money damages by a Chapter 13 debtor 
against a lender under a North Carolina consumer protection statute). 
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against third parties;101 and a proceeding to determine that funds 
allegedly held in constructive trust by a third party were property 
of the bankruptcy estate.102 
II. EXPRESS PRECLUSION BY 28 U.S.C. § 1334 
This Article argues that there is ample evidence within the 
jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 and 1984 bankruptcy 
amendments of Congress’s intent to broadly displace the FAA for 
all bankruptcy-related matters.  A “later enacted statute . . . can 
sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory 
provision,” though “ ‘repeals by implication are not favored’ and 
will not be presumed unless the ‘intention of the legislature to 
repeal [is] clear and manifest.’ ”103  While the legislature may do 
violence to its own earlier legislation, courts should be cautious not 
to do the same on the basis of an incorrect assumption regarding 
the legislature’s intent.  Thus courts “will not infer a statutory 
repeal ‘unless the later statute “expressly contradict[s] the original 
act” ’ or unless such a construction ‘is absolutely necessary . . . in 
order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning 
at all.”104  “Outside these limited circumstances, a statute dealing 
with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a 
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”105  
But no mere inference of intent to displace prior legislation is 
necessary for the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions, 
which express clear intent to repeal any inconsistent statute.  The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, enacted more than fifty  
years after the FAA, provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) that 
“[n]otwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the 
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of  
 
 
101 Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 
1149, 1156–57 (3d Cir. 1989). 
102 Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. 
Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 797–99 (11th Cir. 2007). 
103 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) 
(quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)). 
104 Id. at 662–63 (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988)); see also 
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (“An implied repeal will only be found where 
provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers 
the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’ ” (quoting 
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936))); Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503 
(“[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.”). 
105 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 663 (quotation and citation omitted). 
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all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related 
to cases under title 11.”106  Although repealed in 1984, its 
replacement in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) similarly provides that 
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e)(2),107 and notwithstanding 
any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court 
or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall 
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings 
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 
11.108 
In both versions, the statute includes the phrase “notwithstanding 
any Act of Congress,” clearly showing that the statute is intended 
to displace at least some other acts of Congress.  Thus, there 
should be no need to fear that Congress did not intend to repeal or 
modify its earlier legislation and no need for a presumption 
against repeal or preclusion.   
True, it could be argued that the FAA does not fall within the 
scope of such preclusion.  Strictly speaking, the bankruptcy statute 
does not mention the FAA or arbitration and refers instead to 
statutes conferring exclusive “jurisdiction” on other “courts” 
without specifically mentioning non-judicial adjudicators.109  But 
in analyzing that scope, because of the express language of 
preclusion, there should be no general presumption against 
preclusion in analyzing the statute.  Instead, ordinary principles 
of statutory interpretation should govern the issue of whether 
divestment of jurisdiction by the FAA in favor of non-judicial 
arbitration falls within the scope of the “notwithstanding” clause.  
As the Supreme Court has stated, courts should rely “on 
traditional rules of statutory interpretation [and that] does not 
change because the case involves multiple federal statutes.”110  
 
106 Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598 (HR 8200), Pub. L. No. 95–598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978)) (emphasis added). 
107 Section 1334(e)(2) protects the power of the court with bankruptcy jurisdiction 
to supervise bankruptcy professionals by granting exclusive jurisdiction “over all 
claims or causes of action that involve construction of section 327 of title 11, United 
States Code, or rules relating to disclosure requirements under section 327.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(e)(2) (2018). Section 327 governs employment of professionals to assist and 
represent the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2018). 
108 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2018) (emphasis added).  
109 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(2) (2018). 
110 POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 112 (2014) (citing FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137–39 (2000), superseded by 
statute in part, Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.  
111–31, § 907(d)(3)(A)–(B), 123, Stat. 1776 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387g)); see also, e.g., 
Noll, supra note 46, at 703–07 (explaining why the FAA should not be treated as a 
“super-statute”). 
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The legislative history of the bankruptcy provisions makes 
clear that the jurisdictional grant in § 1334(b) was intended to 
ensure that federal courts hearing bankruptcy cases would have 
the jurisdiction and the ability to oversee all matters that could 
affect the bankruptcy case.  The Supreme Court has explained: 
The jurisdictional grant in § 1334(b) was a distinct departure 
from the jurisdiction conferred under previous Acts, which had 
been limited to either possession of property by the debtor or 
consent as a basis for jurisdiction.  We agree with the views 
expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pacor, 
Inc. v. Higgins, that “Congress intended to grant comprehensive 
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal 
efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the 
bankruptcy estate” and that the “related to” language of § 1334(b) 
must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under 
§ 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings 
involving the property of the debtor or the estate.111 
Comments in the House Report show specific concern that “the 
extra expense entailed by the estate in litigating outside the 
bankruptcy court” or costs incurred in litigating “over whether the  
 
 
111 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (citing S. REP. NO. 95–989, 
2nd Sess., pt.1 at 153–54, 1978; Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (1984), 
overruled in part by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 135–36 
(1995)). Even with respect to the earlier Bankruptcy Act of 1895, the Supreme Court 
has indicated the strong legislative intent to have all matters affecting the allowance 
of claims and liquidation and distribution of estate property heard by the district 
courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. In finding that taxing authorities “must 
submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power” to “participate in the 
assets of a bankrupt” lest the “orderly and expeditious proceedings would be 
impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act would be frustrated,” 
the Court quoted an earlier decision with respect to claims administration: 
We think it is a necessary conclusion from these and other provisions of the 
act that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in all ‘proceedings in 
bankruptcy’ is intended to be exclusive of all other courts, and that such 
proceedings include, among others, all matters of administration, such as the 
allowance, rejection, and reconsideration of claims, the reduction of the 
estates to money, and its distribution, the determination of the preferences 
and priorities to be accorded to claims presented for allowance and payment 
in regular course, and the supervision and control of the trustees and others 
who are employed to assist them. * * * A distinct purpose of the bankruptcy 
act is to subject the administration of the estates of bankrupts to the control 
of tribunals clothed with authority and charged with the duty of proceeding 
to final settlement and distribution in a summary way, as are the courts of 
bankruptcy. 
New York v. Irving Tr. Co., 288 U.S. 329, 332–33 (1933) (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1912)). 
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bankruptcy court has jurisdiction” could tax the estate or give 
unfair “bargaining leverage against” the trustee to parties who 
owe the estate money.112 
An interpretation of the FAA as requiring federal courts 
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction to stay “non-core” or 
“insufficiently core” matters in favor of arbitration would be 
disruptive to the system Congress intended through § 1334 no less 
than divestment of jurisdiction in favor of another court.  For 
example, even though the automatic stay is “one of the 
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy 
laws,”113 the Second Circuit in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill 
required arbitration of an alleged violation of the automatic stay, 
holding under the McMahon test that arbitration of the alleged 
violation “would not necessarily jeopardize or inherently conflict 
with the Bankruptcy Code.”114  As such, the Court of Appeals found 
that through the FAA, parties were able to contractually deprive 
bankruptcy courts of the power to enforce their own orders.115  
Similarly, despite § 1334(b)’s clear intent to provide a forum 
within the federal courts for trustees and debtors in possession to 
adjudicate claims by the estate against third parties, several 
courts of appeals have applied the McMahon test to  
divest bankruptcy courts of such jurisdiction and therefore deprive 
creditors, trustees, and the court itself of the right and  
power to monitor and participate in matters affecting the  
bankruptcy estate.116 
For example, in characterizing an action for turnover of 
property of the estate as a mere claim of a debtor-in-possession 
against a third party, the Eleventh Circuit characterized a matter 
as “non-core” and therefore reversed and remanded the matter to 
 
112 H.R. REP. No. 95–595, xv, at 45–46 (1978). 
113 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494,  
503 (1986). 
114 436 F.3d 104,110–11 (2d Cir. 2006).  
115 Id. at 109–10. But see, Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) 
(“Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain inherent 
authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their 
traditional responsibilities.” (first citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,  
43–46 (1991); then citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); and 
then citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). 
116 See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 492 (5th Cir. 
2002); Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002); Mintze 
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 233 (3d Cir. 2006); MBNA Am. 
Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc., 
479 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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the bankruptcy court “with instructions to compel the parties to 
arbitrate in accordance with the terms of their arbitration 
agreement.”117  In Moses v. CashCall, Inc.¸118 the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the bankruptcy court and ordered arbitration of a 
Chapter 13 debtor’s counterclaim119 against a creditor for damages 
under the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, even as the dissent 
expressed real concern that the particular “tribal arbitration 
procedure specified in the loan agreement [was] ‘illusory,’ ‘a sham,’ 
and ‘unconscionable.’ ”120 
Nothing within § 1334 or the Bankruptcy Code makes 
exception for or requires a federal court exercising bankruptcy 
jurisdiction to divest itself of such jurisdiction in favor of 
arbitration or order arbitration.121  Nor does the FAA contain 
language indicating an intent to modify Congress’s structure for 
bankruptcy law.  Congress has had the opportunity to do so.  For 
example, the Arbitration Act was amended in 1988 to provide that 
enforcement “of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral 
awards, and execution upon judgments based on orders confirming 
such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State  
 
 
 
 
117 Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. 
Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2007). 
118 781 F.3d 63, 66 (4th Cir. 2015).  
119 Counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate 
are statutorily core matters. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2018). However, the Supreme 
Court has held that Section 157(b)(2)(C) violated Article III of the Constitution to the 
extent it authorized non-Article III bankruptcy courts, as opposed to the district 
courts, from entering final orders over such matters if not resolved in the process of 
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim and if without the consent of the parties. Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011). The Court subsequently ruled that bankruptcy 
courts could enter final orders over such matters with the consent of the parties, 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015), or could issue 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to an Article III district court to enter 
final orders. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 38 (2014). 
120 781 F.3d at 67 (Niemeyer, J., writing for the court in part and dissenting  
in part). 
121 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) requires a court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction, upon 
timely motion, to abstain from hearing a non-core matter based upon state law “if an 
action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate 
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2018). It is questionable whether an arbitration 
proceeding constitutes “a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.” And in any event, 
that provision applies only to state law non-core matters for which the federal court 
did not have diversity or other jurisdiction and in which the proceeding had already 
commenced. Id. 
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doctrine.”122  But the Act has not been amended since the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code or the 1984 bankruptcy amendments to repeal 
the effect of § 1334 upon the FAA.123  
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “generalities” in an 
earlier federal statute “should not lightly be construed to frustrate 
a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute.”124  Thus, in 
United States v. Estate of Romani, the Court found the later 
enacted Tax Lien Act of 1966’s more specific rule trumped the rule 
in the more general federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a).  
The Tax Lien Act stated that federal tax liens “shall not be valid” 
against judgment lien creditors until prescribed notice was given, 
while the federal priority statute, “virtually unchanged since its 
enactment in 1797,” provided generally that the United States 
Government “ ‘shall be paid first’ when a decedent’s estate cannot 
pay all of its debts.”125  As explained by the Court, the later tax 
statute was “the more specific statute, and its provisions are 
comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to accommodate the 
strong policy objections to the enforcement of secret liens” and 
“represents Congress’ detailed judgment as to when the 
Government’s claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many 
different sorts of interests.”126  Similarly, the highly detailed and 
comprehensive Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and its jurisdictional 
provisions within title 28, intended by Congress “to grant 
comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they 
might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected 
with the bankruptcy estate,”127 should not be deemed retroactively 
eroded by the short and much more general FAA, enacted more 
than fifty years before and not substantially changed thereafter.128  
 
122 9 U.S.C. § 15, added by Pub. L. No. 100-669, § 1, Nov. 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3969. 
123 Indeed, the principal sections of the Arbitration Act, sections 1 through 9, have 
not been amended since the Act was codified into the United States Code in 1947, 
other than a minor amendment to section 7 in 1951, Oct. 31, 1951, ch 655, § 14, 65 
Stat. 715, and a technical amendment to section 4 in 1954, Sept. 3, 1954, ch 1263, 
§ 19, 68 Stat. 1233. 
124 United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530 (1998) (quoting 
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 635 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
125 Id. at 519–24.  
126 Id. at 532. 
127 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (first citing H.R. REP. NO. 
95–595, at 43–48 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004–09; and then 
citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (1984)). 
128 The largest change to the FAA after 1984 was the addition of a new Chapter 3 
providing for recognition and enforcement of the Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration, added Aug. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–369, 104 
Stat. 448. Through this amendment Congress again showed its ability to make clear 
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Bankruptcy law also holds a special place in federal 
jurisprudence.  Article I of the United States Constitution 
expressly grants Congress the power to establish “uniform Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”129  
This power “includes the power to discharge the debtor from his 
contracts and legal liabilities” and the “grant to Congress involves 
the power to impair the obligation of contracts, [something] the 
States were forbidden to do.”130  While the FAA may have been 
intended “to place an arbitration agreement ‘upon the same 
footing as other contracts,’ ”131 the Bankruptcy Code in its central 
provisions authorizes the modification of contractual rights.132  
Indeed, this would not be the first time that bankruptcy laws 
constitute a rare example of precluding or partially repealing other 
earlier contrary statutes.  The Court in Estate of Romani listed the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as “an additional context in which another 
federal statute was given effect despite the [federal] priority 
statute’s133 literal, unconditional text,” resolving “the tension 
between the new bankruptcy provisions and the priority statute 
by applying the former and thus treating the Government like any 
other general creditor.”134  The Full Faith and Credit Act135 is 
another longstanding but general statute that the Supreme Court 
has suggested has been partially repealed or precluded by 
bankruptcy laws.  In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 
the Court noted that as “an historical matter, we have seldom, if 
 
when Chapter 1 of the Arbitration Act should apply to subsequent statutory 
provisions. 9 U.S.C. § 307 (2018) (“Chapter 1 [9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 ] applies to actions and 
proceedings brought under this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 301–07] to the extent chapter 1 
[9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16] is not in conflict with this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307] or the 
Inter-American Convention as ratified by the United States.”). Yet, Congress has not 
similarly indicated that the FAA should apply to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 or its 
jurisdictional provisions. 
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
130 Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (quoting 
Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902)). 
131 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
68-96, at 1 (1924)). 
132 See, e.g., Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co., 
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating the “very purpose of bankruptcy is 
to modify the rights of debtors and creditors” (internal citation and quotation 
omitted)). 
133 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2018). 
134 United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 531 (1998) (first citing Guar. 
Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 158–60 (1912); and then 
citing Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 317–19 (1925)). 
135 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018). 
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ever, held that a federal statute impliedly repealed § 1738,”136 but 
referenced the holding in Brown v. Felson137 as a possible 
exception.138  In Brown, the Court noted that in 1970 “Congress 
altered § 17 [of the Bankruptcy Act] to require creditors to  
apply to the bankruptcy court for adjudication of certain 
dischargeablility questions,” including those under the 
predecessor to the current exception for intentional torts.139  
Having found “the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over these § 17 
claims as ‘exclusive,’ ” the Court concluded that “it would be 
inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to adopt 
a policy of res judicata which takes these § 17 questions away from 
bankruptcy courts and forces them back into state courts.”140  
Although Brown was decided under the old Bankruptcy Act, 
§ 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 similarly provides  
that debts for intentional torts under  § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) are 
discharged unless “on request of the creditor to whom such debt is 
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such 
debt to be excepted from discharge[.]”141  The Court has continued 
to find applicable under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Brown’s 
holding that state court judgments do not have res judicata or 
claim preclusive effect142 on a bankruptcy court’s determination of 
non-dischargeability for intentional torts.143  In an unpublished 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit has also found that the bankruptcy 
jurisdiction provisions were intended to override the requirement 
for administrative exhaustion under the earlier enacted Contract 
 
136 516 U.S. 367, 380 (1996) (first citing Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 
U.S. 518, 523–24 (1986) (Anti-Injunction Act does not limit § 1738); then citing Migra 
v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83–85 (1984) (§ 1983 does not limit 
claim preclusion under § 1738); then citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 
U.S. 461, 468–76 (1982) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not limit § 1738); 
and then citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96–105 (1980) (§ 1983 does not limit 
issue preclusion under § 1738)). 
137 442 U.S. 127, 138–39 (1979). 
138 Matsushita Electric Indust. Co., 516 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1996) (describing 
Brown’s holding as “declining to give claim preclusive effect to prior state court debt 
collection proceeding in federal bankruptcy suit, without discussing § 1738, state law 
or implied repeals”). 
139 Brown, 442 U.S. at 129–30.  
140 Id. at 136. 
141 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2018). 
142 However, the Supreme Court has found that state court judgments may have 
collateral estoppel or issue preclusive effect on discharge exception proceedings 
pursuant to Section 523(a). Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991). 
143 See, e.g., Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 319 (2003) (“Brown v. 
Felsen . . . governs the outcome here.”). 
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Disputes Act.144  Noting that “a later enacted statute may limit the 
scope of an earlier statute,” that “the Bankruptcy Code does not 
specifically mention administrative exhaustion,” and based on the 
legislative history and purposes of the bankruptcy statutes, the 
court concluded that “Congress intended these broad statutory 
provisions to override the [Contract Disputes Act]’s procedural 
requirements due to the perceived need for virtually all 
bankruptcy-related proceedings to be handled inexpensively and 
expeditiously in but one forum.”145   
Therefore, even in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
finding other federal statutes not to override the FAA, bankruptcy 
is distinguishable.146  The jurisdictional provisions in § 1334, 
together with the legislative history and purposes of the 1978 
amendments make clear that courts exercising bankruptcy 
jurisdiction over any matter related to a bankruptcy case may 
continue to exercise that jurisdiction notwithstanding any 
agreement that would purport to require arbitration. 
III. IMPLIED PRECLUSION BY 28 U.S.C. § 1334 
A. Implied Preclusion Based on Text and History 
Even if § 1334(b) were read as not expressly repealing the 
FAA, the clause still demonstrates congressional intent through 
its text, history, and purpose to impliedly repeal the FAA.  Much 
of the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the FAA has involved 
preemption over state laws or rules seen to impede or impair 
arbitration rights.147  But in POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola 
 
144 United States v. MacLeod Co. (In re MacLeod Co.), 935 F.2d 270 (6th  
Cir. 1991).  
145 Id. at *11, *14–15. 
146 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code has also been treated differently from other 
statutes for purposes of State sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment. In 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, the Supreme Court, highlighting that 
bankruptcy at heart is an in rem proceeding, including the discharge, held that 
bankruptcy court adjudication of the dischargeability of a student loan owed to a state 
entity “is not a suit against a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.” 541 
U.S. 440, 450–51 (2004). The Court expanded that ruling two years later to cover 
“orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts’ in rem jurisdiction, like orders directing 
turnover of preferential transfers,” finding that “the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, 
which shows that the Framers’ primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns’ 
interference with the debtor’s discharge,” demonstrates that the States implicitly 
agreed not to assert sovereign immunity over such matters. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006). 
147 See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 
(2017) (Kentucky common law rule limiting ability to authorize waiver of right to court 
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Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the difference between 
preemption and preclusion.  In this sense, preemption involves the 
relationship between federal and state law while preclusion 
involves the relationship between two federal laws.  As the 
Supreme Court explained:  
In pre-emption cases, the question is whether state law is 
pre-empted by a federal statute, or in some instances, a federal 
agency action.  This case, however, concerns the alleged 
preclusion of a cause of action under one federal statute by  
the provisions of another federal statute.  So the state-federal 
balance does not frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion 
case, any “presumption against pre-emption” has no force.148 
Instead, “[a]nalysis of the statutory text, aided by established 
principles of interpretation, controls.”149  In POM Wonderful, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s false advertising claim under 
the Lanham Act was precluded by labeling requirements under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).  The Court, 
noting that no “textual provision in either statute discloses a 
purpose to bar” Lanham claims over labels regulated by the FDCA, 
found that the “structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act” 
complemented rather than conflicted with each other and 
permitted actions under either statute.150  Additionally, the Court 
found no conflict in the purposes of the two statutes.151  Similarly, 
in its FAA cases, the Court has looked to the text, the history, and 
the purposes of the FAA and the federal statute supposedly in 
 
in power of attorney); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466–67 (2015) 
(California common law unconscionability doctrine against waiver of class arbitration 
right); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337–38 (2011) (same); 
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 530–31 (2012) (West Virginia 
common law principle against waivers of arbitration in nursing home admission 
agreements); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 351 (2008) (California statute referring 
certain disputes initially to an administrative agency); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 
539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (construing broadly FAA’s use of term “involving commerce” to 
the “broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause”); Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684 (1996) (involving a Montana statute making 
arbitration clauses unenforceable unless typed in underlined capital letters on first 
page of contract); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 486 (1987) (involving a California 
statute providing that actions for collection of wages may be maintained without 
regard to private agreement to arbitrate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,  
7–8 (1984) (noting FAA requires state courts, not just federal courts, to stay 
proceedings and order arbitration). 
148 Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 111 (2014) (citing Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563, 565 (2009)). 
149 Id. at 112. 
150 Id. at 113, 115. 
151 Id. at 117. 
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conflict with the FAA to determine whether one impliedly 
precludes or repeals the other.  In Epic Systems, the Supreme 
Court generally explained: 
When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on 
the same topic, this Court is not at “liberty to pick and choose 
among congressional enactments” and must instead strive “to 
give effect to both.” . . . A party seeking to suggest that two 
statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other, 
bears the heavy burden of showing “a clearly expressed 
congressional intention” that such a result should follow. . . . The 
intention must be “clear and manifest.” . . . And in approaching  
a claimed conflict, we come armed with the “stron[g] 
presum[ption]” that repeals by implication are “disfavored” and 
that “Congress will specifically address” preexisting law when it 
wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.152 
As discussed in the previous section, the jurisdictional 
provisions of both the 1978 and 1984 bankruptcy amendments 
show such a “clearly expressed congressional intention” that  
no other federal statute—including the FAA—may deprive 
bankruptcy courts of their original jurisdiction to hear 
bankruptcy-related matters.153  This clear congressional intent is 
further supported by the legislative history.154  
Indeed, the first court of appeals to address the issue after  
the 1978 Bankruptcy Amendments initially found that the 
bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions “impliedly modif[ied] the 
Arbitration Act.”155  The Third Circuit in Zimmerman noted that 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978  
significantly expands the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and is 
based on the notion that to protect the positions of both the 
bankrupt and its creditors, bankruptcy actions should not be 
subject to unnecessary delay and all claims and issues relevant 
to such actions should be resolved in one expeditious proceeding, 
 
 
 
152 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (first quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 
551 (1974); then quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528, 533 (1995); and then quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,  
452–53 (1988)). 
153 See supra Part III. 
154 See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
155 Zimmerman v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1983); see also, 
Cross Elec. Co., Inc. v. John Driggs Co., Inc. (In re Cross Elec. Co. Inc.), 9 B.R. 408, 
410–11 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). 
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finding that “[w]hile the sanctity of arbitration is a fundamental 
federal concern, it cannot be said to occupy a position of similar 
importance.”156  The court, relying upon Wilko, focused primarily 
on the “not easily reconcilable” competing policies behind the two 
statutes,157 but also quoted the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1471158 and its 
legislative history.159  
However, the Third Circuit revisited Zimmerman six years 
later in Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc.160 and decided to depart from its earlier reasoning based on 
subsequent developments.  In 1984, Congress had amended the 
bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions of Title 28 in an attempt to 
address the Supreme Court’s holding in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.161  Northern Pipeline 
held that at least a portion of the 1978 amendments’ delegation of 
authority to the non-Article III bankruptcy courts violated 
Article III of the Constitution.162  The court in Hays, noting that 
the 1984 amendments required certain types of claims  
to be brought in the federal district courts or in state courts, 
concluded that the “congressional policy of consolidating all 
bankruptcy-related matters in the bankruptcy court, relied upon 
by [the Third Circuit] in Zimmerman, is no longer applicable.”163  
 
156 712 F.2d at 56, 59. 
157 Id. at 59. 
158 Id. at 58 n.3.  
159 Id. at 58 (“The House Report reiterated the need for expanded jurisdiction in 
the bankruptcy court [and] further stated that, as a result of the increased 
jurisdiction, ‘all matters and proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy 
cases’ may now be tried in one action before the bankruptcy court.” (quoting H. REP. 
NO. 95–595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6007–6010)). 
160 Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 
1159–60 (3d Cir. 1989). 
161 458 U.S. 50, 85–87 (1982), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments 
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in 
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486 (2011).  
162 Under the 1978 amendments, bankruptcy jurisdiction was nominally placed in 
the district courts but then entirely and automatically transferred to the bankruptcy 
courts. Northern Pipeline involved an action brought by a Chapter 11 
debtor-in-possession against a non-creditor third party under state law. It therefore 
did not arise under Title 11 or arise in the case, but related to the bankruptcy case to 
the extent success would bring additional funds into the estate. The plurality of the 
Court found that to enable a bankruptcy court to “issue final judgments, which are 
binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal[]” over such matters 
“impermissibly removed most, if not all of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial 
power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III 
adjunct.” 458 U.S. at 85–87. 
163 Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160. 
662	 ST.	JOHN’S	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	93:627			
Yet the Hays opinion does not seem to appreciate that the 
1984 amendments affected the allocation of authority between the 
Article III district court and the non-Article III bankruptcy court, 
and not the scope of jurisdiction granted to federal courts 
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction as a whole.164  Nor in concluding 
that Congress had abandoned a policy of “consolidating all 
bankruptcy-related matters” in a single court does the Third 
Circuit mention that through the 1984 amendments Congress 
designated the bankruptcy courts as “a unit of the district court”165 
or that the district courts were given the power—including on 
their own motion—to “withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or 
proceeding” that the district court had referred to the bankruptcy 
court.166  An earlier version of the proposed amendments passed 
by the Senate would have much more broadly required abstention 
regarding purely state law claims.  But that proposal was 
ultimately deleted.  As explained by one House Representative: 
The change in the definition in the Senate-passed bill would have 
contradicted the basic purposes of the consolidated jurisdiction 
we adopted in 1978 in response to the recommendations of the 
commission on bankruptcy laws.  Finally, it would have 
dissipated the assets of the estate by creating a multiplicity of 
forums for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.167 
The court in Hays also pointed to subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions, such as McMahon and the overturning of Wilko by 
Rodriguez de Quijas, as warranting reversal of its conclusion in 
Zimmerman that the jurisdictional provisions provided statutory 
evidence of a congressional intent to supersede the FAA.168  As the 
court stated: 
The message we get from these recent cases is that we must 
carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code would be adversely affected by enforcing an  
 
 
 
 
 
164 “Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between the 
bankruptcy court and the district court. That allocation does not implicate questions 
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 480 (2011)  
(citation omitted).  
165 Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160; 28 U.S.C § 151 (2018). 
166 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2018). 
167 130 CONG. REC. 20, 227–28 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
168 Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160.  
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arbitration clause and that we should enforce such a clause 
unless that effect would seriously jeopardize the objectives of  
the Code.169   
But as discussed above,170 it is dangerous to overgeneralize the 
recent holdings of the Supreme Court on the FAA, given that none 
of the federal statutes at issue in those cases had language similar 
to the bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions.  The court also noted 
that in McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas the Supreme Court had 
found the FAA to require arbitration of claims under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 despite the fact that § 27 of the Exchange 
Act granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims 
under the Exchange Act.171  But as noted above, the Supreme 
Court in McMahon analyzed only whether the anti-waiver 
provision of the Exchange Act was inconsistent with the FAA and 
did not discuss how mandatory arbitration could be consistent 
with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts.172  Nor 
did the statutes at issue include clear preclusion language 
overriding any act of Congress to the contrary.  So even if 
McMahon or Rodriguez de Quijas could be read to include a 
holding that courts should not imply an exception to the FAA 
through a mere affirmative grant of jurisdiction to a federal court, 
the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is not merely implied. 
Lower courts have found other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code to preempt the FAA based on text and legislative history 
even where the statute makes no express reference to arbitration.  
Most notably, courts have concluded that the automatic stay under 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies to and stays arbitration, even though 
there is no express reference to arbitration in the statute.  The 
legislative history to § 362(a) makes clear that the broad language 
staying “the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action or proceeding”173 was intended to 
include arbitration.  The House Report for the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 states that the automatic stay under § 362(a) “is broad 
[and a]ll proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license 
revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings.  Proceeding 
in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings 
 
169 Id. at 1161. Additionally, while all districts have, through local rules, provided 
for the automatic referral of bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts within their 
district, they are not required to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2018).  
170 See supra notes 46–70 and accompanying text. 
171 Hays, 885 F.2d at 1162 n. 12.  
172 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
173 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2018).  
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even if they are not before governmental tribunals.”174  As noted 
by then Judge Alito, under a “long-standing exception to th[e] 
general rule” requiring enforcement of an arbitration award, the 
“automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code promotes a 
public policy sufficient to preclude enforcement of an award that 
violates its terms or interferes with its purposes.”175  Additionally, 
while the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute permits certain matters 
to be adjudicated in other forums, it grants “original” jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy-related matters in the federal courts, and also 
authorizes removal of bankruptcy-related matters initiated in 
state courts to the federal courts in at least certain instances.  
While the grant is “not exclusive” with respect to such matters, 
parties are not necessarily at liberty to seek relief in a forum with 
concurrent jurisdiction during the pendency of the bankruptcy, or 
even attempt to negotiate or otherwise pursue matters in a 
non-judicial manner without first obtaining authorization from 
the bankruptcy court.  For example, the automatic stay broadly 
stays collection efforts against the debtor or property of the estate 
unless relief is first sought and obtained from the bankruptcy 
court.176  Additionally, the rights of the debtor against third parties 
become property of the estate,177 and the bankruptcy trustee 
becomes the representative of the estate with the right to sue and 
be sued.178  The Bankruptcy Code generally requires the trustee to 
seek bankruptcy court approval before selling or using property of 
the estate179 or before compromising or settling a controversy.180  
This normally requires a hearing and notice to all parties  
 
 
 
 
174 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO.  
95–989, at 50 (1978) (“The scope of this paragraph is broad. All proceedings are stayed, 
including arbitration, administrative, and judicial proceedings. Proceeding in this 
sense encompasses civil actions and all proceedings even if they are not before 
governmental tribunals.”). 
175 Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 435 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“We agree that the automatic stay applied to the arbitration and that the panel 
should have halted the arbitration once it became apparent that proceeding further 
could negatively impact the bankruptcy estate. We also hold that the arbitration 
award is invalid because it diminishes the property of the estate.”).  
176 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018). 
177 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018). 
178 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2018). 
179 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2018). 
180 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
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in interest affected by the bankruptcy proceeding, including 
creditors, and the court must make a determination that the use, 
sale, or compromise is in the best interest of the estate.181   
In this sense, the grant of concurrent jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy-related matters differs from the statutes at issue in 
the Supreme Court’s FAA cases.  Rejecting the argument that 
“compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants 
of the judicial forum provided for by” the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had 
granted concurrent jurisdiction over such claims to state and 
federal courts and concluded that arbitration agreements, “ ‘like 
the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the 
objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum 
for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise.’ ”182  
Similarly, the Supreme Court suggested in Rodriguez de Quijas 
that the Securities Act of 1933’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction 
reflected a congressional decision to give plaintiffs choice over 
forum and enforcing arbitration agreements, as a form of 
“forum-selection clause,” advanced “the objective of allowing 
buyers of securities a broader right to select the forum for 
resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise.”183  In 
contrast, § 1334’s failure to grant exclusive jurisdiction over all 
bankruptcy-related matters does not mean that parties are at full 
liberty to use non-bankruptcy forums without first seeking stay 
relief or permission from the bankruptcy court.  Nor does the 
failure to provide exclusive jurisdiction indicate that Congress did 
 
181 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Moeller (In re Age Ref., 
Inc.), 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015) (“A bankruptcy court may approve a 
compromise or settlement on motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing 
pursuant to Rule 9019, but it should do so ‘only when the settlement is fair and 
equitable and in the best interest of the estate.’ ” (quoting In re Foster Mortg. Corp. v. 
United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortg. Corp.), 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995)); 
Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 594 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In bankruptcy 
proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, any compromise between the 
debtor and his creditors must be approved by the court as fair and equitable.” (quoting 
Reynolds v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 861 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1988)); Depoister 
v. Mary M. Holloway Found., 36 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In conducting a 
hearing under Rule 9019(a), the bankruptcy court is to determine whether the 
proposed compromise is fair and equitable, and in the best interests of the bankruptcy 
estate.” (first citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); and then citing LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. 
Holland (In re Am. Reserve Co.), 841 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
182 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (quoting 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)). 
183 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482–83. 
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not believe the federal procedural protections in the Bankruptcy 
Code are important or subject to waiver—including waiver  
in advance through an arbitration agreement.  The Court in 
Rodriguez de Quijas found that federal procedural protections 
such as broad choice of venue and nationwide service of process in 
the Securities Act were not protected from waiver since “the grant 
of concurrent jurisdiction constitutes explicit authorization for 
complainants to waive those protections by filing suit in state 
court without possibility of removal to federal court.”184  A similar 
conclusion cannot be drawn from the grant of concurrent 
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), because these other features of 
title 11 and title 28 do permit removal to federal court and do 
protect the party from state court proceedings, at least 
temporarily.  Moreover, the fact that the bankruptcy provisions 
permit concurrent litigation in other forums should not be read to 
imply that those provisions permit the bankruptcy courts to be 
deprived of their original jurisdiction.  To the contrary, the statute 
is clear that the federal courts shall have original jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy-related matters notwithstanding any act of Congress 
to the contrary.185  This is necessary to ensure that not only the 
signatories to the arbitration agreement, but all parties with an 
interest in the bankruptcy case receive the procedural protection 
and oversight given them by the Bankruptcy Code.186  Thus, the 
early Third Circuit opinion in Zimmerman was correct to find that 
the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions override the FAA, and the 
1984 amendments and Supreme Court’s rulings in McMahon and 
Rodriguez de Quijas do not change that conclusion.  
B. Implied Preclusion Based on Policy Conflict 
Even under McMahon’s “third prong,” the courts of appeals 
have too narrowly interpreted the policies behind the 1978 and 
1984 bankruptcy amendments when deciding whether arbitration 
 
184 Id. at 482. 
185 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 
186 In this sense, too, the reasoning in Rodriguez de Quijas is distinguishable. 
Quoting Justice Frankfurter’s dissent from Wilko, the Court stated: “There is nothing 
in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate 
that the arbitral system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is 
entitled.” Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 
439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In con-
trast, there is nothing to suggest that arbitration between two signatories affords non-
signatory creditors and other parties in interest rights to which they are entitled un-
der the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. 
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inherently conflicts with bankruptcy policies.  As reflected in 28 
U.S.C. § 1334, Congressional policy favors having all matters 
related to and affecting the bankruptcy proceeding heard in a 
centralized federal court with notice to all interested parties, not 
merely “core” matters.  In narrowly interpreting bankruptcy 
policies, the courts of appeals have ignored other important 
reasons for Congress to wish for all matters affecting the 
bankruptcy estate—whether “core” or “non-core”—to be heard in 
the federal courts.  In providing broad bankruptcy jurisdiction, the 
statute ensures that creditors and other parties in interest 
affected by claims by or against the estate have the right to notice 
and the opportunity to object or participate, sets forth consistent 
rules of procedure, and guarantees that the bankruptcy court is 
able to supervise matters affecting the estate as necessary.  
“ ‘A fundamental principle of the bankruptcy process is the 
collective treatment of all of a debtor’s creditors at one time.’ ”187  
This principle is fundamental not only to preserve the parties’ and 
courts’ resources, but also to provide opportunity for all creditors 
and other interested parties to participate and have notice of the 
proceedings.  Bankruptcy “is a collective process, designed to 
gather together the assets and debts of the debtor and to effect an 
equitable distribution of those assets on account of the debts,” and 
the “more participation there is; the better this process works.”188  
To ensure all affected parties’ interests are protected, the 
bankruptcy court is given specific power to monitor and hold open 
hearings on all bankruptcy-related matters.189  The right to notice 
and to participate in matters affecting the estate are ensured 
through the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure.190  Thus, the courts of appeals have overemphasized the 
 
187 Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (quoting 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III, 
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 3:9 (3d ed. 2019)). 
188 Owens, 832 F.3d at 732 (citation omitted). 
189 For example, Section 105(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:  
The court, on its own motion or on the request of a party in interest— 
(1) shall hold such status conferences as are necessary to further the 
expeditious and economical resolution of the case; and  
(2) unless inconsistent with another provision of this title or with 
applicable Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, may issue an order 
at any such conference prescribing such limitations and conditions as 
the court deems appropriate to ensure that the case is handled 
expeditiously and economically . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 105(d) (2018). 
190 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2018) (defining “after notice and a hearing”); 11 
U.S.C. § 107(a) (2018) (“[A] paper filed in a case under this title and the dockets of a 
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fact that under the 1984 bankruptcy amendments, some matters 
must be heard by the district court instead of the bankruptcy 
court.  In doing so, they have failed to appreciate that the 
bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court,191 subject to review 
by and removal of proceedings by the district court,192 and that  
the same Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to 
bankruptcy-related proceedings in the district court, giving the 
same right to notice and to participate to creditors and other 
parties in interest. 193  Thus while, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 157 
provides for the district court to hear particular matters194 and for 
the bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the district court for certain “non-core” 
 
bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at 
reasonable times without charge.”); 11 U.S.C. § 342 (2018) (notice); FED. R. BANKR. P. 
2002 (certain required notice); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004 (process); FED. R. BANKR. P. 
9013 (standard motions); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (contested matters); FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 9019 (compromise and arbitration).  
191  
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall 
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for 
that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court, 
may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any 
action, suit, or proceeding and may preside alone and hold a regular or 
special session of the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or 
order of the district court. 
28 U.S.C. § 151 (2018). 
192 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2018) (jurisdiction for district courts to hear appeals 
from the bankruptcy courts); 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2018) (district court’s power to 
remove proceedings previously referred to the bankruptcy court). 
193 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (“The Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern 
procedure in cases under Title 11 of the United States Code.”); see also, e.g., Phar-Mor, 
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1237 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e believe that 
nothing in the Bankruptcy Rules, and in Bankruptcy Rule 7001 in particular, suggests 
that the rules are limited to core (as opposed to non-core, ‘related to’) proceedings.”). 
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “Rule 1001 was amended in 1987 for the specific 
purpose of expanding the reach of the rules beyond the bankruptcy courts to all courts 
hearing bankruptcy matters.” Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283, 
1287 (11th Cir. 2016). As stated in the advisory committee notes, “amended 
Bankruptcy Rule 1001 makes the Bankruptcy Rules applicable to cases and 
proceedings under title 11, whether before the district judges or the bankruptcy judges 
of the district.” Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 advisory committee’s note to 1987 
amendments) (emphasis added). 
194 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2018) (providing that the “district court shall 
order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district 
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district 
in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy 
case is pending”). 
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matters,195 in either case the same Bankruptcy Code and same 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to the matter.  This 
ensures that all parties affected by the bankruptcy are given notice 
and provided the right to participate, even for matters pending 
before the district court.  The same procedures also apply whether 
a matter “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code or is “non-core” but 
related to a bankruptcy proceeding.  As the Seventh Circuit has 
explained, given “the new jurisdictional scheme” created through 
the 1984 bankruptcy amendments in response to Marathon,  
it would seem anomalous for different sets of procedural rules to 
govern related proceedings in the same court, given the 
bankruptcy scheme’s emphasis on centralization and efficiency.  
The creation of a dual procedural system would not be consistent 
with these goals, nor would it comport with Congress’s intent to 
streamline the bankruptcy process.196  
In contrast, state courts and non-judicial forums such as 
arbitration may not provide the sort of rights given under the 
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules for notice and the right 
of third parties affected by the bankruptcy proceedings to object.  
This is especially true for some types of arbitration, which may bar 
participation by non-parties and make the proceedings and even 
awards confidential.197 
One weakness of the current McMahon-based standard for 
bankruptcy matters is that the centralization and efficiency 
policies discussed by the courts of appeals are likely by themselves 
insufficient justification for the courts of appeals’ rulings, as  
the Supreme Court has held that judicial economy and avoidance  
of “piecemeal litigation” is not enough to override the  
FAA’s mandate.  In reversing a court that had refused to order 
arbitration of some issues on the basis of non-arbitrable matters 
in the same proceeding, the Court stated, “We rigorously enforce 
 
195 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2018) (non-core but related proceedings in which the 
parties have not consented to final order by the bankruptcy court). 
196 Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990). 
197 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648 (2018) (“Arbitration 
agreements often include provisions requiring that outcomes be kept confidential or 
barring arbitrators from giving prior proceedings precedential effect.”) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Hubbard, No. 18-11869, 
2019 WL 115102, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019) (enforcing arbitration agreement 
requiring parties to arbitration to keep any rulings and decisions of the arbitrators 
strictly confidential); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1249, 1252 (10th 
Cir. 2018) (affirming arbitration award involving arbitration agreement requiring “all 
arbitration proceedings, including but not limited to hearings, discovery, settlements, 
and awards [to be kept] confidential”).  
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agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation, 
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another 
federal statute.”198  
Additionally, even if the purpose of the Arbitration Act is to 
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contractual 
provisions, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code is grounded on the 
modification of contractual rights.199  This both ensures that 
honest but unfortunate debtors can receive a fresh start200 and 
that creditors are not unfairly treated due to the machinations 
between the debtor and particular creditors or other third 
parties.201  Bankruptcy centralizes disputes affecting the estate 
not only for efficiency’s sake, but to ensure the indirect rights of 
other interested parties are taken into account and protected.  
Bankruptcy is different from other litigation in this respect.  
Especially because of the discharge, the bankruptcy proceeding 
may be the last and only opportunity for creditors to share in the 
distribution of the debtor’s assets, including proceeds of the 
debtor’s claims against others.  In individual creditor collection 
actions outside of bankruptcy, the first to act or the one most likely 
to gain the cooperation of the debtor may be able to obtain the 
lion’s share of the debtor’s limited assets.  In contrast, bankruptcy 
law ensures a more equitable distribution by including all 
creditors and parties with an interest in the estate in the 
resolution of issues involving obligations owed by or owed to  
the debtor.  
In that process, the two parties to the arbitration  
agreement—usually the debtor and a counterparty who may or 
may not be a creditor of the estate—may not adequately represent 
the interests of other affected parties.  For example, an insolvent 
 
198 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). 
199 See, e.g., Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co., 
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the “very purpose of bankruptcy 
is to modify the rights of debtors and creditors”) (internal citation and quotation 
omitted).  
200 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2018) (discharge “operates as an injunction 
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, 
or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of 
the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.”); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5), 
1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (2018) (noting with certain exceptions, a bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or of holders of 
unsecured claims”). 
201 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548 (2018) (giving trustee power to avoid 
preferential, fraudulent, and certain other types of prepetition transfers by the debtor 
to third parties). 
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debtor in a liquidating bankruptcy case may care very little about 
objecting to claims against the estate, since the resolution affects 
only the distribution between creditors as to assets the debtor is 
not permitted to retain.  Allowing the debtor and the counterparty 
to arbitrate a dispute outside of the purview of the bankruptcy 
court may therefore jeopardize creditors’ indirect interest in the 
resolution of the issue.  To address this concern, the Bankruptcy 
Code gives creditors and other parties in interest the right to 
notice of claims and the opportunity to object.202  Even before the 
bankruptcy case commences, an insolvent debtor may have 
diminished incentive to protect his or her nonexempt assets or may 
be outright hostile to the interests of other creditors.  The 
Bankruptcy Code addresses this issue by appointing a trustee203 to 
represent the general pool of creditors and by giving the trustee 
the power to avoid certain prepetition transfers where the debtor, 
and therefore the estate, did not receive reasonably equivalent 
value, where the transfer was intended to defraud or hinder 
creditors, or where the transfer constituted an unfair preference 
in favor of a particular creditor.204  In order to ensure that the 
trustee acts in the best interest of the estate, creditors are 
generally entitled by the Bankruptcy Code and Rules to notice and 
the opportunity to object to a trustee’s proposed use or sale of 
estate property or to a settlement of a claim by or against the 
estate.205  In contrast, arbitration proceedings between the two 
counterparties to the arbitration agreement may not similarly 
provide notice or the right to participate for nonparties who may 
be affected by the resolution.  
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code expresses a certain 
amount of paternalism, both because insolvent debtors may have 
skewed or insufficient financial incentives, making them act in a 
less than optimal fashion, and because one of the purposes of the 
bankruptcy system is to prevent insolvent debtors from becoming 
wards of the state.206  A bankruptcy debtor’s waiver of the right to 
 
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2018); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007. 
203 Generally, in a Chapter 11 proceeding the debtor-in-possession performs this 
role and is given the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2018). 
But see 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (authorizing appointment of a trustee for cause or 
certain circumstances on motion of a party in interest or the United States trustee). 
204 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 550 (2018). 
205 11 U.S.C § 363 (2010); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2), 2002(a)(3), 6004, 9019(a). 
206 In addition to the statutory prohibitions or invalidations of waiver, there is a 
general equitable rule prohibiting a prepetition waiver of the protection of the 
Bankruptcy Code as against public policy. See, e.g., Bank of China v. Huang (In re 
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receive a discharge is valid only if made in writing, executed 
post-petition, and approved by the bankruptcy court.207  If a debtor 
does receive a discharge, any waiver of discharge of a specific debt 
is ineffective.208  A debtor’s waiver of exemptions in favor of an 
unsecured creditor is ineffective with respect to bankruptcy 
exemptions.209  Nor does such a waiver deprive the debtor of the 
bankruptcy right to avoid judicial and certain other liens  
on exempt property.210  A waiver of the protections under the 
Bankruptcy Code of a debtor against a debt relief agency is 
unenforceable against the debtor “by any Federal or State court  
or any other person.”211  Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code 
invalidates any provision in a contract, lease, or applicable law 
conditioned on the commencement of a bankruptcy case or the 
insolvency or financial condition of the debtor which would 
preclude property from entering the estate or restrict the estate’s 
ability to use, sell, or lease property or assume or assign an 
executory contract.212  Similarly, if a debtor agreed to terms of an 
arbitration agreement that especially benefits a particular third 
party—either because of preferential allegiance towards that 
party or simply because on the verge of bankruptcy the debtor did 
not care or had no choice—the bankruptcy jurisdictional 
provisions ensure that the resolution of issues within the scope of 
such agreement, but related to the bankruptcy, will not jeopardize 
creditor interests. 
 
Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is against public policy for a debtor 
to waive the prepetition protection of the Bankruptcy Code,” and “[t]his prohibition of 
prepetition waiver has to be the law; otherwise, astute creditors would routinely 
require their debtors to waive.”); Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (stating in dictum that “[f]or public policy reasons, a debtor may not 
contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy”); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 
904 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating in dictum that “an advance agreement to waive the benefits 
of the [Bankruptcy] Act would be void”). But see Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc. v. 
U.S. Trustee (In re Franchise Servs. of North America, Inc.), 891 F.3d 198, 207 (5th 
Cir. 2018) (“assum[ing] without deciding that such a waiver is invalid”).  
207 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), 1141(d)(4), 1228(a), 1328(a) (2018). 
208 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2018). The only exception is a reaffirmation of a debt 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), requiring compliance with all provisions of that 
section—including filing the reaffirmation agreement with the court, that required 
disclosures were made and either approval by the bankruptcy court after a finding 
that the reaffirmation of the debt will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or 
debtor’s dependents or a certification of debtor’s counsel to that effect. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 524(c), (d) (2018).  
209 11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (2018). 
210 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2018). 
211 11 U.S.C. § 526 (2018). 
212 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(l), 365(b)(2) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2018). 
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Moreover, the bankruptcy court’s and the United States 
trustee’s ability to supervise bankruptcy cases and matters 
affecting the estate—and in particular to enforce respect for the 
automatic stay and the discharge—are essential to the integrity 
and proper functioning of the bankruptcy system.  The United 
States trustee “may be heard on any issue” in a bankruptcy case 
and “protect[s] the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”213  The 
bankruptcy court may, on its own initiative, “sanction litigants for 
filing documents with ‘any improper purpose’ as well as ‘tak[e] any 
action . . . necessary or appropriate . . . to prevent an abuse of 
process.’ ”214  This includes the power under § 707(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code to dismiss a bankruptcy case filed by a debtor in 
bad faith—a “tool[] Congress has given bankruptcy courts to 
protect their ‘jurisdictional integrity.’ ”215  Bankruptcy courts also 
have both “civil contempt powers to impose compensatory 
sanctions” and statutory authority to award actual and  
punitive damages on creditors who knowingly violate the 
automatic stay.216  Only the bankruptcy “court that issued the 
discharge . . . ‘possesse[s] the power to enforce compliance with’ 
the discharge injunction.’”217   
Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the Second Circuit in 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, an alleged violation of the 
automatic stay does implicate the fundamental purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code even if a bankruptcy case had already closed and 
the debtor received a discharge by the time the action was brought 
before the bankruptcy court.218  Regardless of whether the 
violation was a past or ongoing violation, the “automatic stay 
 
213 Harrington v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 810 F.3d 852, 855 (1st Cir. 2016) (first 
citing 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2012); and then citing In re Youk-See, 450 B.R. 312, 323 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2011)); see also Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 
780 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating the “goal of the Trustee is to ‘promote  
the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all 
stakeholders—debtors, creditors, and the public.’ ” (quoting 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM POLICY AND PRACTICES MANUAL  
§ 1-4.2.1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/volume_1_overview.pdf/download)). 
214 Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d 
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)(1); then quoting 11 U.S.C.  § 105(a) (2012)). 
215 Id. at 1262. 
216 America’s Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In re Schwartz-Tallard), 803 F.3d 
1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012)). 
217 Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 666 F. App’x 766, 774 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Green Point Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean), 794 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (11th  
Cir. 2015)). 
218 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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provision of the Bankruptcy Code” is “one of the fundamental 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.”219  It is 
systemically important that creditors respect the automatic stay, 
both to protect debtors from pressure and harassment and to 
protect bankruptcy estates from dissipation.  The “exercise of 
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and the equitable 
distribution of the estate’s property among the debtor’s creditors 
are two of the three core in rem functions of a bankruptcy court.”220  
The automatic stay “allows the court to carry out both of these 
functions [by facilitating] the orderly administration and 
distribution of the estate” and “protect[ing] the bankrupt’s estate 
from being eaten away by creditors’ lawsuits and seizures of 
property before the trustee has had a chance to marshal the 
estate’s assets and distribute them equitably among the 
creditors.”221  If routinely left unenforced, the bankruptcy stay 
loses its deterrence power.222  So important is the need to enforce 
the automatic stay that, by expressly creating a cause of action for 
debtors to seek damages for a willful violation of the stay, 
“Congress sought to encourage injured debtors to bring suit to 
vindicate their statutory right to the automatic stay’s protection, 
one of the most important rights afforded to debtors by the  
 
 
219 Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) 
(citing S. REP. NO. 95–989, 54; H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, 340). 
220 Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006)). 
221 Id. (quoting Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 
575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
222 As explained by the court in In re Bateman:  
More importantly, a court has a significant interest in enforcing any 
injunction it issues, and this court has not agreed to arbitrate its contempt 
powers. As discussed in more detail below, the court has a substantial 
interest in enforcing its own orders and protecting the integrity of the 
discharge injunction. Contempt powers are vital and significant to any 
judicial process, but are particularly crucial when enforcing injunctions. And 
they may include, in the proper case, those traditional sanctions for coercing 
compliance with an injunction such as incarceration or financial penalty.  
585 B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018); see also, e.g., In re Jorge, 568 B.R. 25, 36 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2017) (“The parties, whether through a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement or any other agreement, cannot strip a court of its inherent power and 
certainly not the inherent power to enforce its own orders. Violations of the discharge 
injunction are inherently non-arbitrable because the discharge injunction vindicates 
a federal right that this Court previously awarded the Debtors—i.e., the bankruptcy 
discharge.”). 
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Bankruptcy Code.”223  But such purpose “can be carried out, of 
course, only if injured debtors are actually able to sue to recover 
the damages that § 362(k) authorizes.”224   
It is also important not to confuse a debtor with a debtor’s 
estate, particularly in reorganization cases where the debtor 
maintains possession of property of the estate and in some respects 
acts as a fiduciary on behalf of creditors.  The Third Circuit in 
Mintze v. American General Financial Services, Inc. (In re Mintze) 
may not have fully considered this in finding that fundamental 
bankruptcy purposes could not be impaired by mandatory 
arbitration of a Chapter 13 debtor’s adversary proceeding against 
a mortgage creditor who had filed a proof of claim in the case.225  
Seeking to enforce a prepetition rescission of the mortgage under 
the Truth in Lending Act, the debtor alleged that the lender had 
“induced her to enter into an illegal and abusive home equity 
loan,” and asserted several other claims under federal and state 
consumer protection laws.  The court emphasized that it was the 
debtor who brought the action and “failed to raise any statutory 
claims that were created by the Bankruptcy Code.”226  But the 
debtor was attacking the validity of a debt and security interest, 
for which the creditor had filed a proof of claim, and therefore 
likely constituted an objection to claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(b).227  An objection pursuant to § 502(b) is, of course,  
a statutory claim created by the Bankruptcy Code, and a 
fundamental part of the bankruptcy system.228  Second, to the 
extent the proceeding sought to collect a claim for the benefit of 
the estate, the debtor was likely acting for the benefit of the estate 
and possibly exercising the powers of a trustee.229  The Third 
 
223 Am.’s Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In re Schwartz-Tallard), 803 F.3d 
1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2015). 
224 Id. 
225 434 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2006). 
226 Id. at 226, 231. 
227 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007(b) (“A party in interest shall not include a demand 
for relief of a kind specified in Rule 7001 in an objection to the allowance of a claim, 
but may include the objection in an adversary proceeding.”). 
228 See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58 (1989) (suggesting 
that allowance and disallowance of claims against the estate are “integral to the 
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations” in bankruptcy).  
229 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2018) (detailing the rights and powers of a Chapter 
13 debtor); Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A] 
Chapter 13 debtor retains standing to continue to pursue [a] civil claim”); Smith v. 
SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 241 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Chapter 13 grants debtors 
possession of the estate’s property, which includes legal interests and the right to 
bring legal claims that could be prosecuted for benefit of the estate.”) (citation 
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Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court had specifically found that 
“the outcome of Mintze’s rescission claim would affect her 
bankruptcy plan and the distribution of monies to her other 
creditors.”230  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals disagreed with 
such finding, in part due to an overemphasis on the importance 
that the debtor was an individual.  But regardless of whether the 
underlying rights arose under state or non-bankruptcy law and 
whether brought by a trustee or a Chapter 13 debtor, the 
adjudication would still have a material impact on creditors, who 
would have shared in the distribution of any funds obtained or 
may have received a larger share of distributions if American 
General Financial Services’s claim was disallowed.  
These holdings demonstrate the danger of the narrow 
bankruptcy exception the courts of appeals have drawn with 
respect to the FAA.  More is at stake than simple efficiency.  It is 
especially important to remember the distinction between the 
debtor and the debtor’s estate and remember the twin goals of 
bankruptcy: both to give a debtor a fresh start and to ensure an 
equitable distribution to the debtor’s creditors.  Thus, while it 
might seem perfectly fair to hold a debtor to his or her voluntary 
agreement to arbitrate disputes outside of bankruptcy,231 in 
bankruptcy those restrictions may have a greater impact on 
creditors who never consented to the agreement.  Congress wisely 
provided a forum for those parties to participate, and they should 
not be deprived of that forum merely because of the prepetition 
agreement of the debtor. 
IV. THE PLACE OF ARBITRATION WITHIN BANKRUPTCY 
This is not to say that the Bankruptcy Code or the policies 
behind it prohibit arbitration. 28 U.S.C. § 654, enacted in 1988,232 
expressly provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to 
 
omitted); Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] Chapter 
13 debtor possesses standing—concurrent with that of the trustee—to maintain a 
non-bankruptcy cause of action on behalf of the estate.”). 
230 In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 227 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin., 
Inc. (In re Mintze), 288 B.R. 95, 99–100 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003)). 
231 Though, of course, the discharge in bankruptcy reflects that at least with 
respect to financial obligations there comes a point where it is fairer to release debtors 
from their obligations—no matter how voluntary they originally were. One cannot 
draw blood from a stone, and at some point continuing to hold those who cannot pay 
accountable for debts becomes a cost for society. 
232 The provision was added by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-61 (1988). 
2019]	 EXPRESS	PRECLUSION	OF	THE	FAA	 677	
the contrary,” with certain exceptions district courts “may allow 
the referral to arbitration of any civil action (including any 
adversary proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the 
parties consent . . . .”233  This provision was enacted subsequent to 
the 1984 bankruptcy amendments and expressly applies to 
bankruptcy proceedings.  But the provision does not require a 
court to refer matters to arbitration, and by its terms only applies 
“when the parties consent.”234  The Bankruptcy Rules similarly 
provide that “[o]n stipulation of the parties to any controversy 
affecting the estate the court may authorize the matter to be 
submitted to final and binding arbitration.”235  Like § 654, Rule 
9019 requires agreement of the parties to the controversy and is 
in the discretion of the bankruptcy court.  
Importantly, unlike mandatory arbitration under the FAA, 
these provisions give both the direct parties to the dispute and 
parties indirectly affected by the dispute because of its relation to 
the bankruptcy case—such as creditors, the United States trustee, 
and any case trustee—notice and the opportunity to object before 
arbitration is ordered.  In many situations creditors might decide 
not to object.  The issue in dispute may be so marginal or a 
creditor’s claim may be so proportionally small in comparison to 
the size of the bankruptcy estate and other creditors’ claims that 
the creditor would not find it worthwhile to spend the time or 
expenses of monitoring or participating even if the issue were 
litigated in the bankruptcy court.  Or a small creditor may choose 
to rely on the bankruptcy trustee to represent its interests and 
might be satisfied so long as the trustee is able to monitor or 
participate in the arbitration proceeding.  Indeed, to the extent 
arbitration is quicker or more cost efficient, a creditor may even 
prefer to allow the matter to go to arbitration.236  On the other 
hand, a large creditor with a relatively large stake in the 
 
233 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2018). 
234 Id. 
235 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c) (1993). 
236 To the extent that a bankruptcy trustee seeks to enforce an arbitration clause 
against a third party with respect to a non-bankruptcy claim of the estate against such 
party, the trustee may be able to do so. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee and 
the estate “the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any entity 
other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and 
other personal defenses,” and a “waiver of any such defense by the debtor after the 
commencement of the case does not bind the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 558 (2018). But 
Bankruptcy Rule 9019 would still require notice and court approval with the 
opportunity for creditors and other parties with an interest in the bankruptcy 
proceeding to object. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (1993). 
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bankruptcy estate or a creditor who distrusts or disagrees with the 
approach of a trustee237 or debtor-in-possession may not want an 
issue that could impact the estate to go to an arbitration 
proceeding.  The bankruptcy system gives such a creditor the right 
to object to arbitration that would take a matter from the  
federal court. 
At least one commentator has noted that the abstention238 
framework already found within 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) may work 
well as a standard for bankruptcy courts’ decision whether or not 
to allow or order arbitration of matters within their jurisdiction.239  
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) provides that “nothing in this section 
prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest 
of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from 
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under  
 
 
237 For example, a creditor may be more willing to invest in upfront litigation costs 
than a trustee where there are few liquid assets in the estate to fund such litigation. 
238 Similarly, to the extent the automatic stay would prevent litigation of certain 
matters against the debtor or estate, a party may be able to obtain relief from the 
automatic stay in certain circumstances. “Cause” may exist to grant relief from the 
automatic stay to permit a claim against the debtor to proceed in another forum.  
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2018). Courts have used various factors in determining whether 
“cause” exists, such as: 
(1) whether relief would result in a partial or complete resolution of the 
issues; (2) lack of any connection with or interference with the bankruptcy 
case; (3) whether the other proceeding involves the debtor as a fiduciary; 
(4) whether a specialized tribunal with the necessary expertise has been 
established to hear the cause of action; (5) whether the debtor’s insurer has 
assumed full responsibility for defending it; (6) whether the action primarily 
involves third parties; (7) whether litigation in another forum would 
prejudice the interests of other creditors; (8) whether the judgment claim 
arising from the other action is subject to equitable subordination; 
(9) whether movant’s success in the other proceeding would result in a 
judicial lien avoidable by the debtor; (10) the interests of judicial economy 
and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation; (11) whether the 
parties are ready for trial in the other proceeding; and (12) impact of the stay 
on the parties and the balance of harms. 
Mazzeo v. Lenhart (In re Mazzeo), 167 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Sonnax 
Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 
1286 (2d Cir. 1990)).  
239 Birney, supra note 23, at 670 (“[T]he bankruptcy courts’ decision to decide to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, or rather, to require the parties to adjudicate the 
dispute in the bankruptcy court, should be exclusively analyzed through the 
framework contained in section 1334(c)(1), and not by treating the FAA as preempting 
bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502 (2011) (noting 
Section 1334(c) as an example that “the framework Congress adopted in the 1984 Act 
already contemplates that certain state law matters in bankruptcy cases will be 
resolved by judges other than those of the bankruptcy courts”).  
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title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.”240  Section 
1334(c)(2), sometimes referred to as the “mandatory abstention” 
provision, requires a federal court to abstain 
[u]pon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a 
State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case 
under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case 
under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have 
been commenced in a court of the United States absent 
jurisdiction under this section . . . if an action is commenced, and 
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate 
jurisdiction.241  
There is a question of whether mandatory abstention under 
§ 1334(c)(2) could ever apply to arbitration—namely, whether an 
arbitration proceeding constitutes “a State forum of appropriate 
jurisdiction” as used in the statute.242  Even if it did apply, the 
statute suggests that it would only apply where such proceeding 
was commenced prepetition and involved only state law claims.  In 
contrast, permissive abstention refers more generally to “the 
interest of justice”243 in addition to comity for state courts as 
warranting abstention and therefore is likely broad enough to 
capture abstention in favor of arbitration.  
In determining whether permissive abstention is appropriate, 
courts have “looked to factors such as the extent to which state law 
issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, the presence of a 
related proceeding commenced in state court, and the likelihood 
that the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court 
involves forum shopping by one of the litigants.”244  Other courts 
have set forth a longer list of factors to consider, including: 
 
240 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2018). 
241 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2018); see also, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re 
Dow Corning Corp.), 113 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or mandatory abstention 
to apply to a particular proceeding, there must be a timely motion by a party to that 
proceeding, and the proceeding must: (1) be based on a state law claim or cause of 
action; (2) lack a federal jurisdictional basis absent the bankruptcy; (3) be commenced 
in a state forum of appropriate jurisdiction; (4) be capable of timely adjudication; and 
(5) be a non-core proceeding.”).  
242 Ironically, the Supreme Court’s holdings that the FAA requires arbitration as 
a matter of federal substantive law, even where state law would override an 
arbitration agreement, tends to further undercut the argument that arbitration could 
be seen as a “State forum of . . . jurisdiction.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (“[T]he FAA ‘create[d] a body of federal 
substantive law,’ which was ‘applicable in state and federal courts.’ ” (quoting 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984))). 
243 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2018). 
244 Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the 
estate if a Court recommends abstention, (2) the extent to which 
state law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the 
difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law, (4) the 
presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court or 
other nonbankruptcy court, (5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, 
other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or 
remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case, (7) the 
substance rather than form of an asserted “core” proceeding, 
(8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core 
bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state 
court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court, (9) the 
burden of [the bankruptcy court’s] docket, (10) the likelihood that 
the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court 
involves forum shopping by one of the parties, (11) the existence 
of a right to a jury trial, and (12) the presence in the proceeding 
of nondebtor parties.245 
Thus, the distinction between “core” and “non-core” matters 
drawn by courts such as Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. or the distinction between matters that 
involve “statutory claims that were created by the Bankruptcy 
Code” and that do not, as drawn by the court in In re Mintze, could 
ultimately be relevant to the determination of whether a 
bankruptcy court should order arbitration of a bankruptcy-related 
matter.246  But there is no bright-line rule based on such 
distinctions.  Instead, other factors such as (1) whether arbitration 
could jeopardize the efficient administration of the estate, (2) the 
degree of relatedness to the bankruptcy case, (3) the feasibility of 
severing the matter to be arbitrated from the bankruptcy case, 
(4) the likelihood that the request to arbitrate is based on forum 
shopping, (5) the presence and rights of nondebtor parties and 
(6) such parties’ ability or lack of ability to participate in the 
arbitration, may all warrant refusal to force arbitration of  
even non-core or state law bankruptcy-related matters.  Moreover, 
unlike under the current approach, it should be the party  
 
 
 
245 Christensen v. Tucson Est., Inc. (In re Tucson Est., Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1167 
(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Republic Reader’s Serv., Inc. v. Mag. Serv. Bureau, Inc. (In re 
Republic Reader’s Serv., Inc.), 81 B.R. 422, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)); see also, e.g., 
In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.3d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting the Tuscon Est. factors).  
246 In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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seeking arbitration who bears the burden of demonstrating that 
arbitration is appropriate and will not impair the rights of any 
party with an interest in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court explained that Congress 
enacted the FAA in 1925 because “in Congress’s judgment 
arbitration had more to offer than courts recognized—not least the 
promise of quicker, more informal, and often cheaper resolutions 
for everyone involved.”247  But in 1978, Congress made a similar 
judgment about the bankruptcy system, recognizing that granting 
broad jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts over all matters relating 
to bankruptcy cases promised not only quicker and cheaper 
resolution but greater due process to all affected by the bankruptcy 
and the prevention of unfair bargaining leverage against trustees 
by parties who owed the estate money.248  So broad was the grant 
of jurisdiction that the Supreme Court subsequently found  
it unconstitutional, at least to the extent it authorized 
non-Article III bankruptcy judges to issue final rulings on certain 
issues.  Congress amended the statute in 1984, but again 
deliberately chose not to diminish the broad grant of jurisdiction 
to the federal courts, instead addressing the constitutional issue 
by slightly reallocating the grant of authority as between the 
bankruptcy courts and the district courts of which they were recast 
as a unit.  In both cases, Congress stated its clear intent that the 
grant of original jurisdiction takes supremacy over any contrary 
federal statute that might otherwise divest the federal courts of 
their original jurisdiction over such matters. 
The language is so clear it seems surprising that courts have 
not yet adopted the approach.  The Third Circuit’s movement from 
Zimmerman to Hays seems to explain that the courts may have 
overestimated the import of the 1984 amendments or drawn 
conclusions about what they saw as a trend in the Supreme Court’s 
rulings on the FAA.  Once Hays was decided, other courts seem to 
have followed its path rather than look for the language that was 
clearly present in the statute.  But it is that approach ungrounded  
 
 
 
 
247 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018). 
248 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
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in statutory text that is “far out of step with [the Supreme Court’s] 
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring 
[arbitration.]”249  
This Article’s proposed approach is based on text, not mere 
policy, and is consistent with Supreme Court precedent on 
preclusion and repeal, both generally and in the context of the 
FAA.  The approach is based on unique features of bankruptcy, 
recognizing Congress’s intent to create procedures for the 
adjudication of bankruptcy cases, and not a general attack on 
agreements to arbitrate.  It does not invalidate arbitration 
agreements, but simply recognizes that an agreement between two 
signatories prior to a bankruptcy proceeding cannot take away the 
procedural protections Congress has given creditors and other 
parties to a bankruptcy case over matters affecting the bankruptcy 
estate—parties who were not signatories to the agreement.  The 
approach also still leaves open the possibility of arbitration of even 
core bankruptcy matters, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 654 and 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(c), but consistent with 
those provisions does not make arbitration mandatory, requires 
consent and bankruptcy court approval, and thus protects the 
interests and due process of creditors and the integrity of the 
bankruptcy system.  
 
249 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). 
